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PARTIES
The case caption lists the names of all parties. Appellee CAROL H. PETERSON,
TRUSTEE OF THE LARRY A. AND CAROL H. PETERSON FAMILY TRUST, is
referred to in this brief as "Peterson." Appellants MARK A. PIERCE and JULIE D.
PIERCE are referred to as "Pierces."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3102(3)0), 78A-3-l 02(4) and 78A-4-103(2)0). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in ruling that Peterson's claim of mutual mistake was not
barred by the statute of limitations or statute of repose?

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 1: Subsidiary factual determinations
are reviewed using the "clearly erroneous" standard. The application of a statute
of limitations to those facts is a legal determination reviewed for correctness.

Griffin v. Cutler, 2014 UT App 251, ~ 14,339 P.3d 100, 103; Ottens v. McNeil,
~

2010 UT App 237,120,239 P.3d 308.

ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in finding that the parties and their predecessors intended
~

the Two-Rutted Lane to be the ''joint driveway" easement referenced in the deeds, thus
constituting a mutual mistake warranting a reformation of the deeds?

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 2: Factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ,r 11, 186 P.3d 978. Factual findings
are clearly erroneous "only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the
evidence, or if this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." Nebeker v. Summit Cty., 2014 UT App 244, ~ 46,338 P.3d 203. Legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc.,
1999 UT 100, if 31,989 P.2d 1077, 1087
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 1
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

ISSUE 3: Did the trial court err in holding that laches did not bar Peterson's claims
regarding reformation of deed and easement by implication?

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 3: Determination of whether a party
was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is a legal conclusion
reviewed for correctness; findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly
erroneous" standard. Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ~ 8,984 P.2d 392,
395; Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990).

ISSUE 4: Did the trial court err in holding that estoppel and boundary by agreement did
not bar Peterson's claims for reformation of deed and easement by implication?

STAND ARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 4: Application of particular facts to the
legal standard of estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. Legal conclusions
are reviewed for correctness and factual findings for clear error. Nunley, 1999 UT
100, ,r 31; State v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Utah 1997).

PRESERVATION: Pierces did not preserve this issue.
ISSUE 5: Did the trial court err in awarding an easement by implication over the area
covered by the Two Rutted Lane?

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 5: Legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness and factual findings for clear error. Nunley, 1999 UT 100, ~ 31.

ISSUE 6: Did the trial court err in awarding Peterson her attorney fees under Utah Code
Section 78B-6-1304(8) from the date Pierces filed their motion to release the lis pendens
through the last day of trial?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law2Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 6: The award of attorney fees is
reviewed for correctness. A trial court's determination of what constitutes a
reasonable fee is reviewed for patent error or abuse of discretion. Paul deGroot

Bldg. Servs., L.L. C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, ,I 18, 112 P .3d 490; Dixie State
Bankv. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,991 (Utah 1988); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305,316 (Utah 1998); Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ,I 127, 130 P.3d 325,348.
PRESERVATION: Pierces did not preserve this issue.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
~

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-l 304; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute over a 50-year-old two-rutted lane ("Two Rutted
Lane") over Pierces' property that has been used by Peterson and her predecessors as the
'joint driveway easement" referenced in multiple deeds. R. 2199. Harold Hatton,
previous owner of both the Pierce parcel and the Peterson parcel, historically used the
Two-Rutted Lane to access his property. R. 2199-2200. When Hatton sold a portion of
his property to Pierces in 1989, he continued to use the Two-Rutted Lane. R. 2208. The
1989 deed to Pierces states that their property is conveyed "subject to and together with
an Easement for Joint Driveway .... " R. 6. Upon Hatton's death, his estate conveyed

vJ

the adjoining parcel to Peterson in 1997, who similarIy used the Two-Rutted Lane to
access the back portion of her parcel. R.9; 2205; 2208-10. The 1997 deed to the Pierces
vJ

contains the same language that the interest is "subject to and together with an Easement
for Joint Driveway ...." R. 9. The "Easement for Joint Driveway" contains a legal
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description of the property over which such easement was to pass. R. 9. Despite the
initial belief that the one-half of the "Joint Driveway" easement sat on either parties'
property-a mutual misunderstanding that the property line straddled the Two-Rutted
Lane-the legal description places the entire easement on Peterson's property. R. 22072208. The Pierces occasionally blocked the Two-Rutted Lane, but Petersons used it as
often as they needed. R.2205, 2208-09. Shortly after Mr. Peterson's death, Pierce
installed a fence on their property, effectively permanently blocking Peterson's use of the
Two Rutted Lane. R. 2209. Peterson sued within months thereafter.

A. Course ofProceedings
Peterson filed this action in October 2013 (R.1-5) and recorded a lis pendens
against the relevant real property. After close of fact and expert discovery, Pierces filed a
motion to release lis pendens R.438-452, whereupon fact discovery was reopened.
R.875-882. After a five-day bench trial, the district court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on May 31, 2016, and its Judgment and Decree on
September 21, 2016. R.2197-2221; 2282-86. Peterson's counsel submitted an affidavit
of attorney fees, and included the amount of attorney fees in the Judgment and Decree.
R.2222-62. Pierces did not object to the amount of attorney fees or challenge the
affidavit. This appeal followed.
B. Disposition in Court

The trial court granted judgment in favor of Peterson, reforming the deeds and
determining that an implied easement existed. R.2282-87. The trial court further granted
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Peterson's request for attorney fees as the prevailing party under Utah Code Section 78B6-1304(8). R. 2282.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Peterson does not challenge the trial court's Findings of Fact, a copy of which is
attached hereto in the Addendum. R.2197-2212. The trial court found the following facts
(relevant on appeal) 1 by clear and convincing evidence:
VD

1.

The properties at issue are adjacent properties and are located in Millard

County, state of Utah. R.2197.
2.

Plaintiff's parcel (hereinafter the "Peterson Parcel") is more particularly

described as:
Parcel 1
The South half of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, less the
South 70 Feet.
Parcel 2

vi

Beginning 10 rods South of the Northeast Comer of Lot 6, Block 49, Plat
A, Fillmore City Survey, thence South 5 rods; thence West 13 1/3 rods;
thence North 5 rods, thence East 13 1/3 rods to the point of beginning.
~

R.2197-98.
3.

Plaintiff and its predecessor in title acquired the Peterson Parcel on July

23, 1997. Exhibits P-16. R.2198.
4.

Defendants' first parcel (hereinafter "Parcel 1") is more particularly

v)

1 The

trial court's Findings of Fact are quoted verbatim herein, with certain facts omitted
due to word limitations in the brief.
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described as:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 194 feet; thence North 70 feet;
thence east 194 feet, thence South 70 feet to the point of beginning.
R.2198.

ijb

5.

Defendants acquired Parcel 1 on June 12, 1989. Exhibit P-14. R.2198.

6.

Defendants' second parcel (hereinafter "Parcel 2) is more particularly

described as:
Beginning 194 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence West 139.5 feet; thence
North 70 feet; thence East 139.5 feet; thence South 70 feet to the
point of beginning.
R.2198.
7.

Defendants acquired Parcel 2 on May 22, 1997. Exhibits P-18, P-19.

R.2198.

8.

Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel were all owned under

common ownership by Harold H. Hatton and Flora Allie G. Hatton . . . . Exhibits P31, P-32. The parties further stipulated to the fact of unity of title for Parcel I, Parcel
2 and the Peterson Parcel. R.2198.

12.

There exists a two rutted lane next to the Peterson Parcel and within

Parcel 1, near the northern boundary of the same as shown on Exhibit P-1
(hereinafter the Two Rutted Lane). Exhibit P-1 is a 2014 aerial google photograph,
but the testimony of all parties is that the location of this two rutted lane as it passes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law6Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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through Parcel 1 is essentially the same as it has been since the late 1930's. The
parties dispute whether this Two Rutted Lane is the joint driveway referenced in the
Defendants' deeds. Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19. R.2199.
13. Further, the parties stipulated that at the time of severance of Parcel 1,
June 12, 1989, use of the two rutted lane was open and apparent. R.2199.
14.

The Peterson home is located on the Peterson Parcel .... ("Peterson

Home"). This home was built in or about 1975 when Harold Hatton retired from
fanning and traded either his farm and/or his equipment to the builder who built the
home. R.2199.
15.

pefendants' home ("Pierce Home") is shown as the home on the bottom

portion of Exhibit P-1. This home has been located in its current location since
approximately the late 1930's. R.2199.
v1;

16.

After Harold Hatton retired from farming, he rented out the Pierce

Home until it was sold to the Pierces in June, 1989. Consequently, from about 1975
until June 12, 1989, the Two Rutted Lane served as a joint drive way to the Peterson
Home and the Pierce Home. During that time, Defendants Mark and Julie Pierce
rented the Pierce Home from about 1986 until they purchased the Pierce Home on
June 12, 1989. R.2199.

18.

The testimony is disputed whether Harold Hatton continued to use the

Two Rutted Lane as a joint driveway after he retired from farming and until his death
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in 1996. However, the court is persuaded by the clear weight of the evidence that

Harold Hatton continued using his tractor to garden, clear off snow for neighbors,
and for other purposes, that he drove his truck up and down the Two Rutted Lane,
and that he otherwise used the Two Rutted Lane as often as he desired to access the
back of his property (Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel), as often as he
needed or desired during that time. R.2200.
19.

This fact is further supported by the testimony of Mark & Julie Pierce

wherein they claim to have given Harold Hatton a license to use the Two Rutted Lane
~

as often as he liked in exchange for the first right of refusal to purchase Parcel 2.
Exhibit P-15. R.2200.
20.

In so finding, however, this court does not find that such a license

existed as the Court will later explain in its findings and conclusions. R.2200.
21.

Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants could not consent to Harold

Hatton's use of the two rutted lane by way of a license because the court likewise
finds that Harold Hatton and Defendants were not clear on the location of the
boundary between the Peterson Parcel to the north and Parcels 1 and 2 on the south.
R.2200.
22.

Specifically, Defendant Mark Pierce testified that the boundary was by

the telephone pole to the east and at about to the southeast comer of the Starley fence
on the west (Exhibit P- 2). Yet, on cross examination, it was clear that the west end
of that boundary (or the Northwest comer of Parcel 1) was roughly 25 to 30 feet
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law8Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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away from the southeast comer of the Starley fence. The Court is persuaded by clear
evidence that all parties considered the southeast comer of Parcel to be where the
fence and the cement marker is, which is 4.5 feet south of where the survey line is ....
. Consequently, the testimony by Mark Pierce that the boundary was by the telephone
pole is just as accurately 4.5 feet south of the telephone pole. R.2200-01 (emphasis
added).
23.

The Court is persuaded by clear evidence that neither Harold Hatton nor

Defendants knew where the survey line actually was for the boundary between the
Peterson Parcel and Parcels 1 and 2, and that this remained unknown until after
Harold Hatton's death and until the line was surveyed and subsequently marked in
~

the fall of 1997. Consequently, use of the Two Rutted Lane by Harold Hatton until
the time of his death was by historical use and under claim of right, not by a license.
R.2201.
24.

When Harold & Allie Hatton as trustees conveyed Parcel I to Mark and

Julie Pierce on June 12, 1989, there was a need to convey an additional seven (7) feet
v)

by way of an easement so that Parcel I could be subdivided from the main parcel.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that all parties understood that this
~

frontage requirement was the purpose of and reason for the seven foot easement
north of Parcel I (the south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel). The purpose was not
for the joint driveway, and inclusion of the joint driveway language in Exhibit P-14

in that seven feet easement was a scrivener's error. R.220 I.
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25.

This finding is supported by, among other things, the plain language of

Exhibit P-14 which expressly makes the conveyance of Parcel 1 subject to a joint
driveway, and all parties testified, including Defendant Mark Pierce, that there was
only one access way back into Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel,
which was the Two Rutted Lane that has been in existence for roughly 70 years. The
Court is not persuaded in the least that Harold or Allie Hatton, as Trustees, ever
intended to convey Parcel 1 to Defendants without expressly giving themselves
access to use the two rutted lane so they could access the remainder of their property
(Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel). The Court is simply not persuaded
by Defendants' license claim especially in view of the express grant of an easement
for a joint driveway in Exhibit P-14. R.2202.
26.

Further, when Mark Pierce spoke with the surveyor, he told the

surveyor that the purpose of the seven foot easement north of Parcel 1 was for
frontage. Exhibit P-37, page 73, 74. R.2202.
27.

Moreover, Julie Pierce testified that the seven foot easement was never

used as a joint driveway and that the purpose of the seven foot easement was for
frontage, not for a joint driveway .... R.2202.
28.

Keith Dalton testified that if the parties did not intend the seven feet as a

joint driveway, but for frontage only, and that the two rutted lane was the intended
joint driveway, then there was an error in the deed. R.2202.
29.

Dale Robinson, the surveyor, further testified without rebuttal that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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typically legal descriptions are inserted into deeds by someone other than the grantor,
and that the grantor just assumes that the legal description says what he intended it to
say. Exhibit 37, page 55:25-56:5. R.2203.
30.

The Court is persuaded by the historic use of the Two Rutted Lane, by

the testimony of the parties, by Hatton's need to use the Two Rutted Lane to access
Parcel 2 and the west side of the Peterson Parcel, as well as other testimony
introduced at trial and through the exhibits, that there was a scrivener's error, that
Harold and Allie Hatton, Trustees, intended the seven foot easement solely for
frontage, and that they believed they expressly reserved use of the Two Rutted Lane
in Exhibit P-14 as the joint driveway. R.2203.
31.

The Court is further persuaded that Mark and Julie Pierce were equally

aware that the south seven feet in the Peterson Parcel was for frontage purposes only
and that the Two Rutted Lane was to be kept and preserved as a joint driveway ....
R.2203.
32.

With regard to the survey, following the death of Harold and Allie

Hatton in 1996 ... , Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo Dunnell became the successor trustees
to the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust ... (hereinafter the "Hatton Family
~

Trust"). Because of previous family distrust and disputes, Lynn Hatton requested that
a survey be completed in connection with the sale of the Peterson Parcel to Larry and
Carol Peterson. R.2203.

V)

33.

~

That survey was not completed until July 8, 1997. This was after Parcel
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2 was conveyed to Mark and Julie Pierce. Consequently, the court takes nothing by
the fact that the deeds for Parcel 2 reiterated the south seven feet of the Peterson
Parcel as the joint driveway. The Court finds this was nothing but a perpetuation of
the scrivener's error originating in the deed to Parcel 1. R.2204.
Julie Pierce testified that the portion of the property that is identified in the
deeds as the "easement" was her grandfather's lawn, and she would not have driven
on that property. This testimony further supports the Court's findings that the Pierces
did not believe that the joint driveway was to be located anywhere other than the two
~

rutted lane that had been used for decades. R.2204.
34.

The survey had been completed, however, when Larry and Carol

Peterson took title to the Peterson Parcel. There is a dispute in the evidence what was
on the ground by way of markers from the survey, when Larry and Carol Peterson
purchased the Peterson Parcel. The evidence is undisputed that the surveyor did not
set the corners of the survey until the fall of 1997. Mark Pierce testified that the
surveyor placed survey flags on the corners, but there was no evidence that the flags
were placed in such a way that an ordinary person without surveying know ledge
would understand the purpose of the flag's location. Mark Pierce testified that he met
with Larry Peterson near the telephone pole, that there was a flag there, and that he
told Larry that flag meant that was the boundary of the property. He stated, however,
that Larry did not agree with him that that was the property line. R.2204.
35.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that when Larry and Carol Peterson purchased
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~

the property, they were aware of the dispute over the boundary. Exhibit P-21. The Court
specifically finds by clear evidence that both Larry and Carol Peterson as well as their
Grantors, Trustees of the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was
the joint driveway referenced in the Pierces' deeds. Further, the Peterson deed expressly
included easements, rights of way and appurtenances. Exhibit P-16. Given that language
and the language in the Pierce deeds, (Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19), that expressly makes
Pierces title subject to a joint driveway, and given that there has never been but one lane
used as a joint driveway between the Peterson Home and the Pierce Home, the Court
finds by clear evidence that Larry and Carol Peterson took title with the full expectation
and reliance that they would have access to the west of their property through the Two
Rutted Lane. R.2205.
36.

Moreover, the Court finds that Larry and Carol Peterson did in fact use the

Two Rutted Lane as a joint driveway as often as they needed. The testimony was clear
VJ9

and convincing that Larry Peterson mowed the grass strip between the two rutted lanes
weekly from the time he purchased the property until shortly before his death or that he

vJ

had others mow the strip on his behalf when he was unable to do so. Mark Pierce testified
that he did not see Larry Peterson do this, but he also admitted that he worked from 8:00
a.m. until 5 :00 p.m. Mondays through Fridays since before the Petersons purchased the
Peterson Parcel to the present time. His testimony did not effectively rebut the clear
testimony from Carol Peterson and others that Larry and Carol Peterson thought the joint

~

driveway was theirs equally with the Pierces, and that they used the Two Rutted Lane and
cared for it like it was their own property. R.2205.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37.

At the time of the conveyance of Parcel 2, Betty Jo Dunnell, the only

surviving Co Trustee of the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane
was going to be used by both property owners as a joint driveway. R.2206.
38.

Betty Jo Dunnell always understood the phrase "joint driveway" to

mean that both owners had access to the driveway, as that is how it had always
been. At the time of this conveyance to Defendants, Betty Jo Dunnell, as cotrustee of the Hatton Family Trust, did not have any understanding that the Trust
was conveying away the Two Rutted Lane or the joint driveway. That was not her
intent. Indeed, her intent was that she was conveying access to the joint driveway
which had always been the Two Rutted Lane. The Court is persuaded by this
testimony. R.2206.
39.

After the Pierces acquired Parcels 1 and 2 and after Petersons acquired

their parcel, the Pierces had the surveyor mark the survey corners. This was in the
fall of 1997, roughly eight years after the Pierces acquired Parcel 1. See Exhibits P-8,
P-22. This was after all the conveyances at issue. Exhibits P-14, P-16, P-18 and P-19.
Prior to this time, the property line between Parcels 1 & 2 and the Peterson Parcel
was not surveyed and marked and the Court finds there was some confusion between
the parties as to the precise location of the property line. R.2206.
40.

Every fence surrounding the original Hatton Family Trust parcel (Parcel

1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel) is several feet off from the survey line. Exhibit
P-2. R.2206.
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41.

Many speculate on what Harold Hatton said about the joint driveway,

but the only document signed by Harold Hatton plainly states that the Pierces' receipt
of Parcel I was "subject to" the joint driveway. See Exhibit P-14. The deeds to both
~

Parcels 1 and Parcel 2 clearly make the conveyance to the Pierces "subject to" the joint
driveway. See Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19. This "subject to" language would have been
entirely unnecessary if the parties to those deeds had understood the location of the
property line and that the joint driveway was the south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel
as the Pierces now argue. . . . R.2206-07.
42.

Larry and Carol Peterson's offer to purchase the property from the Hatton

Family Trust is also instructive. The offer is for the purchase of four parcels of property
and demonstrates that all parties understood the joint driveway was partly on the Pierce
property and partly on what was eventually the Peterson Parcel. . . . It is not logical for
the Petersons and the Hatton Family Trust to agree to sell the Peterson Parcel and the
joint driveway (Exhibit P-24, Parcels A and B) if the Parties understood the joint
driveway were entirely on the Peterson Parcel as the survey later showed unless at the
time, they were operating under the misunderstanding that the joint driveway was partly
on Parcel 1 or the Pierce property. The Court finds that the parties indeed were
operating under a mutually mistaken belief that the joint driveway was partially on
both the Peterson Parcel and Parcel I. R.2207-08.

44.

After the conveyance to the Pierces, Mr. Hatton continued to use the

driveway without incident until his death. R.2208.
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45.

The Pierces were aware of Mr. Hatton's regular use of the driveway.
~

R.2208.
46.

After Mr. Hatton died and the Peterson Property was conveyed to Larry

and Carol Peterson, Larry and Carol Peterson also used the driveway on a regular
basis to gain access to the back of the Peterson Property without asking permission of
the Pierces. The clear testimony is that they used it as often as they needed, including
weekly to mow the grass and otherwise maintain the Two Rutted Lane. R.2208.
4 7.

The Petersons used the shed in the back portion of their property to

store tools and equipment. R.2209.
48.

David Peterson, the son of Larry and Carol Peterson, would frequently

come to visit his parents and help out around the house. He would routinely take the
truck to the back of the Peterson Property using the Two Rutted Lane between the
Pierce Property and the Peterson Property. Since Larry Peterson's passing, David
Peterson maintained the strip of lawn until the Pierces installed the fence on the north
edge of the driveway. R.2209.
49.

David Peterson would not ask the Pierces for permission to use the

.driveway on such occasions. R.2209.
50.

After Larry Peterson's death, Mr. Pierce became confrontational about

the Petersons' use of the driveway, demanding that they request permission or
attempting to deny access. R.2209.
While the testimony also established that Mark Pierce made attempts to
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prevent the Petersons from using the driveway, the Court is not persuaded that such
attempts were sufficiently successful to deprive the Petersons from such use.
R.2209.
51.

The Petersons were able to access the back of the Peterson Property by

using the Two Rutted Lane until the Pierces constructed a fence on the north edge of
~

their property in July, 2013. The fence essentially prevents the Petersons' use of the
Two Rutted Lane altogether and leaves the Petersons without reasonable access to
their property. This lawsuit was initiated shortly thereafter. R.2209.
52.

Without the use of the Two Rutted Lane, the Petersons cannot access

the back portion of their property with a vehicle absent great difficulty. R.2209.
53.

There is no reasonable access point on the north side of the Peterson

Home. R.2210.
54.

The Petersons have a garden in the back of their property. They have

sheds on the back of their property. They have fruit trees on the back of their
property. Their use of the Two Rutted Lane is not a daily requirement. However, on
occasion, they need to use the Two Rutted Lane to service the garden, access their
sheds, trim trees and bushes, etc. The Court finds that a reasonable use should be
allowed. R.2210.
55.
~

This Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the

Two Rutted Lane is the joint driveway as referenced in the relevant deeds and
recorded documents. Exhibits 14, 15, 18 and 19. The clear weight of the historical
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evidence and photographs demonstrate that the Hattons intended to reserve to
~

themselves and their successors in title use of the Two Rutted Lane as a joint
driveway. See e.g., Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, & 25. Specifically, with respect to
Exhibit 14, the Court finds that the "subject to and together with a joint driveway"
language was a clear attempt by Harold Hatton and Allie Hatton, trustees, to reserve
a right of way over Parcel I for use of the Two Rutted Lane. The legal description
following the joint driveway language in Exhibit 14 was in obvious error. As Julie
Pierce, a party to Exhibit 14 testified, the parties intended the easement for seven feet
north of Parcel 1 as additional frontage so they could sever Parcel 1 from the entire
Hatton property. She testified that that seven feet was not intended to be used as a
joint driveway, but that the joint driveway was the Two Rutted Lane. Further, neither
Pierces nor the Hattons nor the Petersons ever used the seven feet north of Pierce's
property as a joint driveway .... R.2210-11.
56.

After this lawsuit commenced, in an effort to rebut the legal

presumption of adverse use when the use is in excess of 20 years, Defendants now
claim that they allowed Harold Hatton to use the joint driveway by way of a license.
They claim they granted Harold Hatton a license to use the driveway during his
lifetime in exchange for the agreement for a right of first refusal to purchase Parcel 2.
They claim that right of first refusal was given to Defendants at the time Parcel 1 was
conveyed to them. Exhibit P-15. Nowhere in Exhibit P-15, however, is there even a
hint of this license. This is odd, especially if the first right of refusal was given in
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exchange for the license. The lack of any evidence whatsoever supporting a license
in the right of first refusal Agreement, is itself evidence that no such license existed ..
R.2211.

58.

The fence along the south boundary line of the Pierce Property is 4.5 feet

farther south than the south boundary line described in the deeds as surveyed. In other
ViP

words, the southeast comer of Parcel 1, which is the beginning point for the legal
description of both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, is off 4 ½ feet south, with the practical result
being that the joint driveway is approximately half on the Parcels 1 and 2 and half on
the Peterson Parcel. Exhibits P-2, P-7, P-11. R.2211-12.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A. Pierces Fail to Marshal Facts Sufficient to Satisfy Their Burden of Persuasion
with Respect to Their Statute of Limitations, Repose, Mutual Mistake, Laches,
and Implied Easement Arguments.
{;;Jj

Pierces challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's
factual findings regarding the application of statute of limitations and repose, mutual
mistake, laches, and implied easement doctrines to this case. In so doing, Pierces
improperly attempt to re-try their case before this Court. See Gunn Hill Dairy Properties,
~

LLC v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 2015 UT App 261,119,361 P.3d 703

(rejecting challenge to factual finding where party did not specifically challenge findings
but instead "reargue[d] their position on appeal"). Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules
vi

of Appellate Procedure, appellants challenging factual findings must marshal the
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evidence in support of the fact finder's findings. A party who does not marshal under
this rule "will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal." State v.

Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, iJ 42,326 P.3d 645. Specifically, an appellant "cannot merely
present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in support of [his or her]
position" and "[n]or can [he or she] simply restate or review the evidence that points to
an alternative finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact.'' Austin v.

Bingham, 2014 UT App 15, ,I 12,319 P.3d 738 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I
78, 100 P.3d 1177).
The proper standard for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether
the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed
to factual findings .... " Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if 41. In these matters, a trial court's
factual findings are considered presumptively correct, and the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the findings. College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork

Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989).
In key respects, Pierces' arguments are inadequately briefed, and they repeatedly
fail to marshal the facts on the issues they appeal.

B. Peterson's Mutual Mistake Claim is Not Time-Barred by Law or Equity.
Pierces attack the trial court's finding that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run on her claims until the summer of 2013 when Pierces erected a fence. R.2214.
Pierces emphasize selective facts they would have preferred the trial court had relied
upon, while ignoring other crucial facts. The trial court correctly relied on the fact that
Peterson continued to use the Two-Rutted Lane as though she had an absolute right to use
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~

it as often as she needed, and Pierces did not block that right in any "permanent or real
way until they put up the fence in the summer of 2013," among other facts R. 2214. For
these same reasons, the trial court concluded that !aches does not bar Peterson's claims.

C. Pierces Cannot Overcome the Abundant Evidence ofMutual Mistake.
The trial court correctly found that Peterson and Pierce and their predecessors
were mistaken regarding the deed language relative to the joint driveway easement The
trial court found "abundant" evidence of mutual mistake. R. 2213-2214. Pierces ignore
these facts and provide no basis for how the trial court's legal conclusions are incorrect.
\£fJ

D. Pierces' Claims ofEstoppel and Boundary by Agreement Are Not Preserved.
Pierces contend on appeal that the doctrines of estoppel and boundary by
agreement should have provided relief to them below. However, by their own admission,

~

they did not preserve these issues. Brief at 3. They raise them for the first time on appeal
and therefore, these arguments should not be considered. Whether preserved or not, the
arguments are baseless.

E. The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Attorney Fees.
Based on Peterson's claims affecting title and interest in property, she recorded a
lis pendens at the outset of litigation. Near the close of the initial fact discovery deadline,
Pierces filed a motion to release the same. R.430-452. No immediate hearing was held
on the motion. The court agreed with Plaintiff that essentially the same evidence would
be relied upon and the same witnesses at trial would likewise be called to testify at the
~

hearing on the lis pendens motion. R. 709-1 0; 1694. Consequently, the trial court ordered
that the motion to release lis pendens be heard in conjunction with the trial. R.1694. The
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trial court correctly awarded Peterson her attorney fees from the time Pierces filed their
Motion to Remove Lis Pendens. Pierces do not challenge the reasonableness of the fees,
per se-they merely challenge the fact that fees were awarded from the time of filing
their motion to release through the last day of trial. In any event, Pierces did not preserve
this issue below. They did not object to or challenge or request a hearing on the Affidavit
of Attorney Fees (R.2222-62) filed by Peterson. Therefore, they waived their right to
contest the attorney fee award. See Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC, 2016 UT App 71,
,, 26-27, 371 P.3d 49.

F. Pierces Failed to Preserve Their Argument Regarding Width ofEasement.
Pierces did not preserve their complaint that the Court increased the easement
from seven feet wide to ten feet. Brief at 13. They failed to oppose the relevant motion
on this issue; therefore, the issue need not be entertained on appeal.

G. Peterson Should Be Awarded Her Attorney Fees on Appeal.
~

Peterson requests an award of her attorney fees incurred on appeal. "[W]hen a
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to
fees reasonably incurred on appeal."' Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 319 (quoting Utah Dep't of

Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). "This court has
interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a
statute initially authorizes them." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah
1996).
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ARGUMENT

I. By Failing to Marshal the Facts, Pierces Cannot Satisfy Their Burden of
Persuasion with Respect to Their Arguments on Statutes of Limitations and
Repose, Mutual Mistake, Laches, and Implied Easement.
With regard to Pierces' arguments concerning statute of limitations and the doctrine
of !aches, mutual mistake, and implied easement, they fail to satisfy their burden of
~

persuasion. They improperly attempt to re-try their case before this Court. See Gunn Hill

Dairy Properties, LLC, 2015 UT App 261, iJ 19. Under Rule 24(a)(9), appellants
challenging factual findings must marshal the evidence in support of the fact finder's
findings. A party who does not marshal under this rule "will almost certainly fail to carry
its burden of persuasion on appeal." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if 42. A party fails to
~

challenge factual findings where the party picks and chooses documents or testimony
from the record that seemingly undercut the findings of the fact finder. See R.B. v. L.B.,

vJ

2014 UT App 270, if 27,339 P.3d 137, 147 (holding that a party failed to shoulder burden
of challenging factual fmdings where he argued "in effect that a selected portion of the
evidence supporting the court's findings provided inadequate support without addressing
the additional supporting evidence").
Peterson strongly objects under Rule 24(a)(9) (requiring appellant to support

i.:J

argument with "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on")
and applicable case law because Pierces' arguments are inadequately briefed. "Appellants
have the burden to clearly set forth the issues they are appealing and to provide reasoned
argument and legal authority." ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT
24, if 16, 309 P .3d 201. "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of
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the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court."' Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, iJ 8, 995 P .2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). This Court may disregard briefs that do not comply with
the briefing requirements. Van Den Eikhof v. Vista School, 2012 UT App 125, iJil 5, 7,
278 P.3d 622 (declining to consider merits of brief where, among other deficiencies, it
failed to include adequate record citations). Pierces' briefmg is fatally deficient because it
only sparsely cites the record and fails to cite and discuss controlling case law.
Additionally, Pierces fail to adequately attack the trial court's factual fmdings.
The proper standard for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is "whether the
appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to
factual findings." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, iJ 41. In these matters, a trial court's factual
findings are considered presumptively correct, and the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the findings. College Irr. Co., 780 P.2d at 1244; see also Nielsen, 2014
UT 10, iJ 30 (evidence and all reasonably drawn inferences viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict). For these reasons, the standard for reviewing factual findings is
"highly deferential." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,168, 345 P.3d 1195. Pierces' claims
fail at the outset because they omit several crucial facts that are harmful to their position,
as set forth below.
Regarding the application of the statute of limitations and doctrine of laches to the
facts, Pierces selectively focus on facts they interpret to be favorable to them, to the
exclusion of all others. For example, Pierces argue that (1) Peterson claims ignorance_ of
her injury over a 16 year period "while she lived next door, was shown the survey
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markers, and was informed in writing to seek permission before crossing the Joint
Parcels" (Brief at 12); (2) that "there has been no direct evidence that Hattons ... knew
the precise location of the easement which they placed on their own property .... Carol
Peterson also testified that she helped her father measure the parcels many times, yet the
Petersons only recently disputed the easement" (Brief at 12) (emphasis in original); and
(3) the trial court found that "Plaintiff or her predecessor could have brought a claim to
reform the deed after discovering the survey line, in 1997, between the Parcel A
[Peterson Property] and the Joint Parcels [Pierce Property]." Brief at 13.
vJ

In so doing, Pierces ignore crucial facts which the trial court relied upon in
reaching its conclusion regarding the statute of limitations and !aches claims:
(I) the seven foot easement (actually described in the deeds) was never
used as a joint driveway, and its purpose was for frontage only (R.2202);
(2) Mark Pierce testified that the surveyor placed survey flags on the
corners, but there was no evidence that the flags were placed in such a way
that an ordinary person would understand the purpose of the flags' location
(R.2204);
(3) Even after the survey, Larry Peterson did not agree with Pierces as to
the property line (R.2204; see also R.2197, Findings ,r 55);
(4) Petersons, as well as their Grantors, the trustees of the Hatton Family
Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was the joint driveway
referenced in Pierces' deeds (R.2205);
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(5) Petersons took title with the full expectation and reliance that they
would have access to the west of their property though the Two Rutted Lane
(R.2205);
(6) Petersons used the Two Rutted Lane as a joint driveway as often as
they needed (R.2205);
(7) Larry Peterson mowed the grass trip between the two rutted lanes
week.I y from the time he purchased the property until shortly before his death,
or that he had others mow the strip on his behalf when he was unable to do
so (R.2205);
(8) Every fence surrounding the original Hatton Family Trust parcel
(Parcel 1, Parcel 2, and the Peterson Parcel) is several feet off from the survey
line (R.22 06);
(9) The only "established" common driveway between the Peterson
Parcel and Parcel 1 that was actually used as a common driveway was the
Two Rutted Lane (R.2208);
(10) After Hatton died and the Peterson Property was conveyed to
Petersons, Petersons used the driveway on a regular basis to gain access to
the back of their property without asking Pierces' permission (R.2208);
(11) David Peterson, son of Larry and Carol Peterson, would frequently
visits his parents and help out around the house; he would routinely take the
truck to the back of the Peterson Property using the Two Rutted Lane, and
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since Larry's passing, David maintained the strip of lawn between the rutted
lanes until Pierces installed the fence (R.2209);
(12) Pierces' attempts to prevent Petersons from using the driveway were
not sufficiently successful to deprive Petersons from using the Two Rutted
Lane (R.2209);
(13) Petersons were able to access the back of the Peterson property by
using the Two Rutted Lane until Pierces constructed a fence on the north
edge of their property in July 2013 (R.2209);
(14) Other facts as cited the fact section above, including the trial court's
findings on Hatton's understanding that the joint driveway was the Two
Rutted Lane and that neither Hatton nor Pierces knew the correct boundary
line between the two properties because they measured from the southeast
comer of Parcel 1 which fence was 4 ½ feet south of the property line; and
y;})

(15) Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the trial court's Conclusions of Law (R.2197,
Conclusions ,r,r 2, 5).
~

By ignoring these facts and emphasizing a handful of facts that they believe the trial court
should have relied on, Pierces fail to marshal the facts and to show how the trial court's

v;

legal conclusions were incorrect.
Regarding mutual mistake, Pierces have also failed to meet their obligation to
marshal the facts. Pierces begin by referencing the paramount importance of the intent
of the parties when construing deeds. "Hattons let everyone know their intention was to
provide frontage so they could settle the Joint Parcels, and the deed itself locates the
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easement to provide for that specific intent." Brief at 17. But Pierces overlook the fact
that the trial court itself dealt with the frontage issue:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that all parties understood
that this frontage requirement was the purpose of and reason for the seven
foot easement north of Parcel 1 .... The purpose [for the frontage easement]
was not for the joint driveway ... .
R.2201. Pierces focus on Peterson's alleged "actual notice of the boundaries" (Brief at
17), devoid of the context of historical use of the parties and their predecessors for over
50 years, on which the trial court relied so heavily. R.2199-2203, 2205, 2213. Pierces'
own argument hurts them: "Historically, neither adjoining landowner has claimed a
mistake regarding the 1997 Hatton/Peterson deed ...." Brief at 17. Neither side claimed
a mistake because they were able to use the Two Rutted Lane even after the various
conveyances, and because of the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the deeds.
Pierces claim Petersons and Hatton commissioned a review of the deeds,
purchased Title insurance, obtained and recorded a survey, and were given "actual notice
when Pierces showed them the markers indicating the location of the property line and
easement." Brief at 19. However, during the deposition of surveyor Dale Robinson
(which was read into the record at trial), he stated that he did not meet with the Dunnells
and Hattons to give them a copy of the survey; he simply mailed it to them. R.2762, Day
Two Trial Transcript at 227:21-24. He never discussed the contents of the survey with
them in person. Id. at 228:2-4. Pierces claim that Petersons were given "written notice
of the condition of the easement. ... " Brief at 19. They provide no citation to the record
for this assertion, and continue to focus solely on facts they deem favorable to their
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position. This does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Pierces ignore the fact that
Petersons disputed Pierces' claims about the survey lines and continued to use the
easement as often as they needed. R.2208-09. There was no evidence that the survey
flags "were placed in such a way that an ordinary person without surveying knowledge
would understand the purpose of the flag's location." R.2204.
Moreover, even if one were to assume Petersons had actual lrnowledge of the
property line following the survey, it does not follow that they knew they had no right to
use the Two Rutted Lane. Pierces' deed, as the trial court found, gave Hatton and his
successors in title, including Peterson, an express grant to use the Two Rutted Lane. See
Trial Exhibits P-14 and P-19 and compare the appurtenance language in Petersons'
~

deeds, P-16 and P-17, in Addendum. The trial court found by clear evidence that the
Two Rutted Lane was in fact the joint driveway referenced in the deeds. R.2197,
Findings ,r 55. Consequently, the location of the property line on this issue is immaterial.
Petersons continued to use the joint driveway until Pierces put up a fence in the summer
of 2013.
Regarding Pierces' attacks on the trial court's findings of fact relative to the
implied easement issue, they have likewise failed to meet their burden of marshaling the
facts. Pierces claim they gave pennission to Hattons to access Parcel 2 over Parcel 1 for
remainder of Hatton' s life; they claim it was a temporary arrangement; and that the
Petersons asked permission before crossing, in support of their claim that the "reasonable
necessity" for the easement was for Hatton's tractor and farming practices only. Brief at
27. In so doing, Pierces ignore the facts set forth in ,r,r 46-54 of the trial court's Findings.
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R.2208-2210. Instead, they cherry-pick the few facts that they interpret as being helpful
to their case. This practice fails to satisfy Pierces' burden of persuasion.
II. Peterson's Claims Are Not Time-Barred by Either Statute of Limitations or
Laches.

Beyond failing to marshal the facts and inadequately briefing the issues, Pierces
fail to show that the trial court's findings of fact relative to the application of the statute
of limitations or laches are clearly erroneous, or that its legal conclusions in these
respects are incorrect.
A. Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Statute of Limitations is No Bar to
Peterson 's Claims.

The applicable statute oflimitations is found in Utah Code§ 78B-2-305(3).
Pierces' primary argument is that the statute began running in 1997, when the survey was
complete. However, they also contend that the deeds themselves imparted notice of its
contents to Peterson, "regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in its execution,
attestation, or acknowledgment." Utah Code Section 57-4a-2. The type of defects
contemplated in this statute are not in issue here. The defect or mistake involved here is a
legal description of the 'joint driveway'' easement that places it in a location other than
the historical use of the Two-Rutted Lane. 2

2

Although it has no relevance to their claim that Peterson's claim is time-barred, Pierces
complain here that the Court increased the easement from seven feet wide to ten feet.
Brief at 13. Pierces did not preserve this issue below-they did not oppose Peterson's
Motion to Enter Judgment and Decree. R.2263-71. Therefore, the Court of Appeals need
not entertain this argument. In any event, seven feet was clearly the width allowed for
frontage, but it was not the width, as the trial court found, for the joint driveway. With
the parties' belief that the joint driveway was one-half on Pierces' and one-half on
Peterson's properties, the width could easily have been fourteen feet.
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Moreover, the deeds themselves are internally inconsistent. Both the 1989 and the
1997 deeds to Pierce (Addendum, Trial Exhibits P-14 and P-16) provide that the Pierces
take title to their property "subject to" an easement for a joint driveway. Pierces' current
claim that the joint driveway was entirely on Peterson's property is not consistent with
the "subject to" language of their deeds. No burden whatsoever is upon Pierces' property
~

from the joint driveway. The joint driveway according to the deed description goes down
Peterson's lawn, not the Two Rutted Lane. The trial court found that this was clearly not
what either party, Pierces or Hattons, intended.
Here, the applicable statute is three years "for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; except that the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the

~

aggrieved party of the facts constituting tl1e fraud or mistake." Utah Code§ 78B-2305(3). In this context, Pierces rely on language in the trial court's findings that
"Plaintiff or her predecessors could have brought a claim to reform the deed after
discovering the survey line, in 1997 .... " R.2214. However, Pierces' citation to the trial
court's analysis in this regard is incomplete. The trial court went on to find that

4@

Petersons claimed they had an absolute right to use the joint driveway, used it as often as
they needed, and Pierces did not block that right in any permanent or real way until they
put up the fence in the summer of 2013. R.2214. Pierces have not established or even
argued that these findings are clearly erroneous. Instead, they try to ignore them.
Therefore, the legal conclusion that the statute began running in 2013 is correct.
Importantly, the trial court expressly found that where a deed of record is
internally inconsistent, the Court has inherent equitable powers to clarify and correct the
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ambiguous deed and avoid a perpetual mistake continuing of record, notwithstanding the
statute of limitations. See Judgment and Decree, R.2286. In other words, when the deed
is internally inconsistent, the statute of limitations might run against Pierces just as easily
as against Peterson. Peterson, through her predecessor in title, acquired a clear right to
use a joint driveway that burdened Pierces' property. If the deed is ambiguous, how can
one party claim his interpretation is correct when the deed could just as easily be
construed against him? The trial court retains inherent equitable power to correct
mistakes of record such as this. Pierces have not challenged this conclusion of law.
Finally, Pierces argue that adverse possession bars Peterson's claim. Brief at 14.

It is unclear exactly what the Pierces are arguing on this point. They contend that Utah
Code§ 78B-2-214 and Utah Code§ 78B-2-225(3) are statutes of repose not subject to
equitable tolling, consistent with Willis v. De Witt case. But Willis is inapplicable here.
Willis held that Utah Code § 78B-2-225(3)(a)-pertaining to actions related to

improvements in real property-is a statute of repose. 2015 UT App 123, ,r,I 8-10, 350
P.3d 250. Willis involved the construction of a new home, and the litigant's claim was
barred because they did not commence their action within six years of taking possession
of the home. Id.

,r,r 2, 12.

The case at bar does not involve improvements to property;

neither is it a case where a statute of repose applies. The issue is one of control.
Notwithstanding Pierces' payment of property taxes and title to the land where the joint
driveway is located, they clearly did not control the joint driveway. As the trial court
found, Petersons used the joint driveway as often as they found necessary. R.2197,
Findings ,I,I 44-51, 55. In any event, the trial court held that the statute oflim.itations did
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated32
OCR, may contain errors.

~

not begin to run until the summer of 2013 when Peterson's access was blocked. See
viP

R.2214, 2286-87. Pierces have not demonstrated that this legal conclusion is incorrect.

B. The Doctrine ofLaches Does Not Bar Peterson's Claims.
Pierces likewise fail to show any error in the trial court's findings or legal
conclusions relative to the doctrine of laches. Pierces state, without citation to authority,
vJ)

"If a respondent can evidence disadvantages which stem from this detrimental reliance
the notion that no lawsuit would be filed, the movant' s claim should be thus dismissed ..
. ." Brief at 21. Peterson is somewhat puzzled at what Pierces mean here. Pierces claim
they have improved the land and "rearranged the property to suit their changes of
circumstance" without any detail as to how an easement over their property harms them,
especially in light of the historical usage of the easement. Id. Pierces emphasize the
improvements they made to their land as evidence of reliance on the boundary line or
how they have been damaged by the delay in filing an action. Id. But Pierces simply did
not establish at trial, nor do they argue persuasively on appeal, that their alleged
improvements will be lost due to Peterson's use of the easement.

~

Pierces argue that Peterson has manifest "undue delay'' in filing her action. Brief
at 22. But this argument-like so many others----depends upon the omission of the

vo

crucial facts relied upon by the trial court. The trial court observed that Larry Peterson
did not agree with Pierces about the property line, even after the 1997 survey, and in any
event, he continued to use the Two Rutted Lane as though he had, and believing he in
fact had, an express right to do so. R.2204. Petersons had an affinnative right, as
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successors in title to Hatton, to use a joint driveway, and no other joint driveway existed
other than the 50-year-old Two Rutted Lane. R.2205, 2208-09. Petersons were able to
continue using the easement as their absolute right as often as they needed until just after

Larry Peterson's death. Id. However, as soon as Pierces' fence went up, and Peterson's
ability to use the easement to access her property was thwarted, Peterson filed this action.
R.2209.
Pierces attempt to compare their "agreement" with Hatton to a boundary
agreement similar to the one involved in Bahr v. Imus. Brief at 22. In Bahr, the plaintiff
brought a claim for trespassing and quiet title based on a boundary dispute. 2011 UT 19,

,I 10,250 P.3d 56. The Utah Supreme Court ultimately found that the moving parties
were entitled to summary judgment, not on the basis of boundary by estoppel or
boundary by acquiescence, but on the basis of boundary by agreement. Id. ,I 21. Pierces
do nothing more than cite a general description of the objective of boundary by
agreement as a legal concept, and nothing more. No analysis is provided. 3 They claim,
without citation to the record, that Hattons and Pierces "had an agreement as to the
location of the property boundary and easement," alleging that said agreement was
"memorialized in the deed." Brief at 22. Pierces ignore, however, the substantial amount
of evidence of mutual mistake and the inconsistencies in the deeds. R.2213-14.

See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) ("While failure to cite to pertinent
authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court.")
3
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In discussing Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, Pierces highlight the principle that
laches is '" delay that works a disadvantage to another."' 2013 UT 4 7, ,r 17, 321 P .3d
1021 (citing Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1951)). Pierces fail to
provide any analysis as to how the alleged "delay" in bringing this action has
disadvantaged them. Furthermore, they do not discuss the two elements of laches set
forth in Insight Assets. 2013 UT 4 7, ,r 19. That case dealt with the "relative priorities of
a vendor purchase money mortgage and a third-party purchase money mortgage," and has
little if any application here. Id.

,r 1.

Pierces next claim that Peterson fails the test established in George v. Fritsch Loan

& Trust Co., 256 P. 400, 403 (Utah 1927), which "prohibits parties seeking reformation
~

from negligence in executing a contract, or from untimely application for reformation."
Brief at 23. Pierces then makes unsupported claims, without any citation to the record
and, in fact, in contradiction of the findings entered by the trial court, that Peterson knew

~

the "easement" was on her property, and that she never disputed the location of the
easement on her property. On the contrary, Petersons used the easement, or joint
~

driveway, on Pierces' property since they moved in, and Pierces themselves acknowledge
that the seven-foot easement on Peterson's property was never used as a joint driveway.
R.2208. Pierces' argument is completely baseless.
The trial court entered findings that Petersons used the joint driveway as often as
they needed, without asking permission, as a matter of absolute right, based upon the

t,i)

express grant of a joint driveway easement in Pierces' deeds (Addendum, P-14 and P-19),
and the "together with and appurtenant to" language in Peterson's deed (Addendum, P-16
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and P-17). See also R.2204-05, and 2208-09. Pierces fail to show that any factual
findings relative to the application of the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
were "clearly erroneous." Furthermore, they are unable to demonstrate how the trial
court's legal conclusions are incorrect. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should be
upheld.

III. Pierces Fail to Reveal Any Error in the Trial Court's Findings or Conclusions
Regarding Mutual Mistake and Reformation of the Deeds.
Pierces claim they had no mistaken idea as to location and size of the easement.
Brief at 16. They cite intent of the parties as paramount in these types of cases.
However, they completely disregard the following facts that the trial court relied on as
manifesting that intent: Findings, 1112, 16, 18, 21-31, 33, 37-46, and 55-58. R.21992204, 2206-08, and 2210-12. These facts were found by the trial court following five
days of trial, multiple witnesses and exhibits, and roughly 1400 pages of transcript.
Pierces mostly just ignore this evidence.
The trial court also observed the inherent self-serving nature of Pierces' contention
that they were not mistaken. R.2213-14 (citing McMahon v. Tanner, 249 P .2d 502, 506
(Utah 1952) regarding lack of mutuality). As evidenced by the facts above, the trial court
looked to extrinsic evidence to demonstrate existence of mutual mistake. See Warner v.

Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Parol evidence is admissible to show
the writing did not confirm to the intent of the parties.").
Pierces claim the intent behind including the easement language in the deeds was to
provide frontage for the benefit of the Pierces, not an easement to encumber them. Brief
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at 17. They argue that Peterson ignores Hatton' s intent for the easement as frontage.
This argument undercuts Pierces' position. As the findings above clearly show, the fact
that the seven foot "easement" was given on Peterson's property plainly reveals the
mistake, since the deeds mentioned that both properties would be "subject to" a joint
driveway, coupled with the fact that, at the time, the Two Rutted Lane was the only
driveway used by the parties to access their land, and the seven-foot easement has never
been used as a 'joint driveway." R.2208.
Next, Pierces claim that Peterson's argument that mistake was perpetuated in
subsequent deeds is "inconsistent with the doctrine of merger .... " Brief at 17. They cite
Dobrusky v. Isbell in support of their position. In that case, plaintiff argued that the deed
~

did not reflect the predecessor's intended agreement. 740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that that argument did not overcome the doctrine of
merger. Id. Here, the deeds are internally inconsistent, referring to an easement for a
joint driveway to which Pierces' title is subject while the metes and bounds description
places the joint driveway outside Pierces' property, rendering the "subject to" language
meaningless. The merger doctrine simply has no application here.
Pierces also cite RHN Corp v. Veibell as supportive of their claim. Brief at 18. In
that case, the relevant issue was whether the parties' primary intent was to convey a
certain amount of acreage or to convey property with specific boundaries defined by
metes and bounds. 2004 UT 60, ,r 43, 96 P.3d 935. The Utah Supreme Court started out
with this premise: "In deed construction, metes and bounds descriptions prevail over
acreage." Id.

vP

,r 44.

Pierces' attempt to apply this principle to the facts at bar is strained at
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best. There is no issue of acreage here for the metes and bounds description of the
easement to trump. The metes and bounds description simply does not describe the ''joint
driveway" that the parties intended. Moreover, the fact that the seven foot easement
described by metes and bounds in the deeds was never used as a joint driveway
completely eviscerates Pierces' argument regarding primacy of a legal description.
R.2208.
In arguing that the trial court ignored the specific language of deeds, Pierces focus
solely on the legal description of the easement while ignoring vital language elsewhere
such as "subject to" and ''joint driveway." See deeds, R.6, 9. Pierces claim that this
language is vague, and that the trial court incorrectly favored it over the more specific
and exact language of the metes and bounds description of where the "easement" was
apparently located. Brief at 20-21. But there is nothing vague about the phrase "subject
to ... a joint driveway," especially in light of the historical use of the Two Rutted Lane
by Hattons and Pierces, and then Peterson and Pierces. It was not error to focus, as the
trial court did, on the use of the Two Rutted Lane since 1975 and on its location in
essentially the same place as in the late 1930's. It is clear from the "abundant" evidence
of historical use of the Two Rutted Lane where the ''joint driveway'' easement was
actually located. That location was not the frontage easement or "grandpa's lawn."
R.3213, Julie Pierce testimony, Day Three Trial Transcript at 256:6-23. The language in
the deeds simply reflects that reality. As the trial court concluded:
This 'subject to' language would have been entirely unnecessary if the parties
to those deeds had understood the location of the property line and that the
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joint driveway was the south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel as the Pierces
now argue.
R.2207. The Pierces have failed to show that the trial court's findings and conclusions
regarding mutual mistake are clearly erroneous or incorrect.

IV. Pierces Have Not Shown Any Error Committed by the Trial Court in Finding
that an Easement by Implication Exists.
Pierces contend that the trial court erred in finding that an implied easement exists
by relying on the "joint driveway'' language in the deeds as opposed to the circumstances
surrounding the deeds. Pierces cite Butler v. Lee for support. There, the Court of
Appeals relied upon "attendant circumstances" that the parties intended to pass title
subject to a continuing right of access. 774 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The
trial court has done the same here. It considered the fact that the Two Rutted Lane has
been in the same place since the late 1930's, that Hatton used it before and after the
conveyance to Pierces, and that Petersons used it after the conveyance from Hatton. In
sum, the trial court found factual support for each element of the implied easement claim.
R.2215-18.
Pierces claim the necessity has only recently arisen. Brief at 26. This is simply
false. The location of the Two Rutted Lane, as it passes through Parcel 1, is essentially
the same as it has been since the late 1930's. R.2199. Hatton used it for several years.
R.2199-2200. Petersons began using the Two Rutted Lane upon purchasing the land in
1997. R.2205. Likewise, Pierces' "stranger to the deed" argument is unavailing. Brief at
26. They argue that the statute of frauds exists to ensure one cannot reserve an easement
for a third party not involved in the transaction. This is a correct statement of law, as far
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as it goes, but it is inapplicable here. An implied easement is necessarily created at law in
the absence of a writing.
Pierces spend a fair portion of their brief contending that the trial court erred in
concluding that a "reasonable necessity" exists. They claim they gave permission to
Hattons to access Parcel 2 over Parcel I-which he needed, they claim, only for his
tractor and farming practices-for the remainder of Hatton's life, that it was only a
temporary arrangement, and that after his death, Petersons asked permission before
crossing. Brief at 26-27. Again, Pierces focus on selective facts, and ignore a plethora of
other facts that contradict their claim. See R.2208-2210, ilil 46-55. The trial court
observed:
Much of the time at trial was spent on this issue, and unnecessarily so. The
law does not require absolute necessity, only a reasonable necessity.
Consequently, the Court need not find that Plaintiff cannot access the west
of her property absent the Two Rutted Lane. Rather, the Court need only
find by clear evidence that access absent the Two Rutted Lane is
unreasonably difficult. The Court so finds.
R.2216-1 7. The Pierces do not argue that this legal conclusion is incorrect.
Pierces rely for support on the concept that, "[ w]here a person opens the way for
Ci.,

use of his own premises and another uses it without interfering with the landowner's use
or causing him damage, the presumption is that the use was permissive." Brief at 27
(quoting Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291, 293 (Utah 1891)). But here, it was not
Pierces who "opened" the way for use of their own premises. R.2198-99. Use of the
Two Rutted Lane or joint driveway existed from about 1975 when Hatton started renting
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what is now Pierces' home and Hatton lived in the Peterson's home. R.2199. The use as
a joint driveway existed long before Pierces acquired title.
Pierces rely heavily on Alcorn v. Reading, 243 P. 922 (Utah 1926) to support their
argument. However, that case was overruled by Adamson v. Brockbank:
To the extent that the case of Alcorn v. Reading holds there can be no
easement by implied grant because of the right to condemn, it is overruled.
The true test is the reasonable necessity existing therefor, and we reaffirm
this principle. If an alternate way permits a grantee to make use of his land
at little or no cost, the availability of this means might be a factor in
detennining the necessity of the easement.
185 P .2d 264, 274 (Utah 1947). Pierces latch on to this principle of "alternate way" in
their attack of the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions regarding implied
easement. They claim that Petersons have alternate access "at no cost." Brief at 28.
They provide no reference to the record for this claim. They contend that Petersons may
simply access the back of their property along the South strip of their property. Brief at
~

29. This is not what the trial court found. R.2197, Findings ifil 52-54, and Conclusions

ifil 11-12.

The trial court concluded that, absent the Two Rutted Lane, Peterson's access

to her property was unreasonably difficult. R.2217. In other words, there was not an
alternate way that permitted access "at little or no cost." The Pierces simply argue as
though these specific findings were not made.
Next, Pierces discuss the issue of frontage, and that the "purpose of placing the
easement on Parcel A was to make the lot compliant" with zoning laws. Brief at 30. In
l:JI

one breath, the Pierces claim Petersons should use the "easement" on their own property,
and in the next breath they insist that that "easement" was only to make Parcel I
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compliant with zoning laws. This does nothing but manifest the need for the Two Rutted
Lane as an easement. It is the only "joint driveway'' that has been used as such by the
parties and their predecessors in title. R.2208, 2210, 2213. Pierces have failed to show
any error of fact or law sufficient to overturn the trial court's ruling with regard to
implied easement.

V. The Remaining Issues of Estoppel, Boundary by Agreement, and the
Challenge to the Attorney Fees Award Were Not Preserved Below and
Therefore Should Be Disregarded.
Pierces raise three issues on appeal that were not preserved below:
~

arguments regarding estoppel and boundary by agreement, and a challenge to the
attorney fees award.
A. Estoppel and Boundary by Agreement

By their own admission, Pierces have not preserved the issue of estoppel. Brief at
3. As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.
See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Our

preservation rule does not permit a party to waive an issue before the district court and
later raise the issue on appeal." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration
Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 108, 299 P .3d 990. "To preserve an issue for appeal, the matter

must be presented to the trial court in such a manner that the trial court has the
opportunity to rule on the issue." Bowen v. Hart, 2012 UT App 351, ,r 10, 294 P.3d 573.
To properly preserve an issue at the district court, the following must take place: "( 1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3)
a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger v.
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~

Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Pierces failed to meet these requirements. In opening argument, counsel made
passing reference only to estoppel. R.2396, Day One Trial Transcript at 65: 19-20.
~

Pierces briefly discuss estoppel in a Rule 41 Motion (R.2013, pp. 6-7) with no analysis
and citation only to the adverse possession statute, and briefly in their Trial Brief
(R.1959, pp. 9, 15) with citation only to a case involving the doctrine of laches. Finally,
counsel for Pierces made passing reference to estoppel in closing argument, again with no
analysis or authority cited. R.4035, Day Five Trial Transcript at 44:2, 10-14; 50: 18-23.

Vi

Pierces have not preserved this argument.
Even assuming arguendo that the estoppel argument was preserved, it is without

~

merit. Pierces argue that Hatton "promised the Pierces that if they took care of him and
[his wife] for the rest of their lives, the Pierces would have [Parcel 2], they would have an
easement, and their property would be on the line that is recorded in the deed that he
wrote." R.4078, Day Five Trial Transcript 44:11-14. Aside from the fact that this
argument is self-serving and conclusory, it is not supported by the trial court's findings.

~

Moreover, this is apparently a "promise" from Harold Hatton, and not the Petersons.
Therefore, estoppel would not apply in any event. 4

4

vJ

The elements of promissory estoppel include: "(I) a promise reasonably expected to
induce reliance; (2) reasonable reliance inducing action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person; and (3) detriment to the promisee or third person." Weese v.
Davis County Comm 'n, 834 P .2d I, 4 n.17 (Utah 1992).
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Pierces next argue that Petersons accepted the deed without dispute, and when
they did, they accepted the terms and should be estopped from claiming otherwise. Brief
at 25. However, Pierces ignore the trial court findings that Petersons immediately began
using the joint driveway as Hatton, their predecessor, had used it. The language of the
deeds and historical usage eviscerate any estoppel claim. Further, as Julie Pierce
admitted in her trial testimony, Pierces knew there was only one joint driveway and that
that was not "grandpa's lawn" or the seven foot frontage easement. R.3213, Day Three
Trial Transcript at 256:6-23. Given that testimony, Pierces can claim no detrimental
reliance where Peterson used the joint driveway consistent with that understanding.
On appeal, Pierces give only cursory mention of the elements of estoppel. Brief
at 24. They assert that Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, when applied to this case,

~

"analogously demonstrates the failure of the trial court to apply operations of law," but
provide no analysis. This argument should be disregarded for failure to preserve and for
failure to adequate Iy brief. 5
Pierces further claim that an undisclosed "boundary agreement" was adhered to
for over 16 years. Brief at 24. This argument was likewise not preserved and therefore
should be disregarded on appeal. Even assuming it were preserved, the claim has no
merit. Pierces cannot point to any evidence on the record as to the details of any such

5 See

Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (a brief is inadequate if it merely contains "bald citation to
authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority"). "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that
are not adequately briefed." Id.
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"agreement." Hatton used the Two Rutted Lane contrary to the legal description for the
easement in the deeds. R.2199-2200. There is no boundary agreement. Furthermore, this
"boundary agreement" argument is not developed with legal analysis and should be
disregarded.

B. Attorney Fees
As a preliminary matter, Pierces claim they were unaware that the trial court was
considering their motion to remove lis pendens as detenninative of an award of
Peterson's attorney fees for the entire case. 6 Brief at 31. Based on the following timeline,
it is unreasonable for Pierces to think anything else. Pierces filed their Motion to Release
the lis pendens September 2014. R.438-52. Peterson's Opposition, in which attorney
~

fees were requested, was filed shortly thereafter. R.703. Petersons then filed a Motion for
Pretrial Conference on January 22, 2015. R.840-44. Pierces submitted the Motion to
Release Lis Pendens for decision on February 10, 2015, without submitting a reply
memorandum. R.873. Next, Pierces filed a motion to reopen discovery on February 18,
2015 (R.875-81) Peterson opposed it, and a hearing was held on March 9, 2015. At the

~

hearing, the trial court ruled that "Defendants' Motion to Release Lis Pendens shall be
heard at trial beginning July 21, 2015." R.1694-97. The order partially granted Pierces'

1-J

motion to reopen discovery. Pierces then filed several motions, all of them unsuccessful.
R.933-37; R.940-44; and R.947-65. The July trial dates were continued until January

6

Contrary to Pierces' claim, the award of attorney fees does not cover attorney fees for
the "entire case." Fees were expressly awarded from the time Pierces filed their Motion
to Release Lis Pendens in September 2014 (the action commenced in October 2013)
(R.1-5), through the last day of trial (R.2220, 2224).
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2016. Therefore, by the time trial came around, a hearing had not been held on Pierces'
motion. It is not reasonable for Pierces to assert that they did not expect to argue said
motion at trial, or that any attorney fees would cover that time period especially when a
prior court order expressly provided that the motion to release would be heard at trial.
R.1694-97.
More importantly, the issue of attorney fees and Pierces' hope for an award of fees
in their favor was one of the driving forces of this case. R.2396, Day One Trial
Transcript at 4 7: 1-48: 11. Counsel is just not being honest when he claims that Pierces
were not aware that attorney fees were an issue for trial. Id. For these reasons, among
others, the award of attorney fees from the time of filing the motion through the final day
of trial is proper.
Next, Pierces claim they "had no opportunity to raise this issue during trial." Brief
at 32. Again, this is simply not true. Peterson requested attorney fees in her Opposition
to Motion to Release Lis Pendens. R.703 at p. 9. Pierces themselves requested attorney
fees in bringing their motion to release the lis pendens. R.440 at pp. 8-9. Indeed, Pierces
specifically requested fees at trial in their opening statement. R.2396, Day One Trial
Transcript at 48:8-11.
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order expressly stated:
"Plaintiffs attorney is directed to submit an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs
consistent with the rules, allowing Defendants to review and otherwise object to the same
before submitting them to the Court. If there is an objection, the Court may set the matter
for further hearing and issue a final decision." R.2220. Consistent with this order,
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counsel submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs, together with a partially
redacted billing history, pursuant to the rules. R.2222-62. Pierces did not object or
challenge the affidavit. 7 Pierces simply failed to preserve this argument and it should be

...

disregarded. See Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, il 108 (refusing to

,,\
VY

consider a litigant's argument based on failure to preserve when that party did not timely
raise the proper objection in the proceedings below).
Here, since the evidence supporting the reasonableness of the requested fees-as
reflected in the affidavit of attorney fees and accompanying billing statements (R.222262)-is "both adequate and entirely undisputed," it would have been an abuse of
discretion to award less than the amount requested "unless the reduction is warranted by
one or more of the factors described in [Bracken, 764 P.2d at 987-91]." Martindale v.

Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These factors include the amount in
controversy, the extent of services rendered, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency
wS

of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent
on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount
~

involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved. Bracken, 764 P.2d at 989. Pierces argue none of these factors on
appeal. Therefore, no reduction is warranted since Pierces did not preserve the issue

~

Subsequently, Petersons filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.2035,
at pp. 36-39), and a proposed Judgment and Decree (R.2274, at pp. 4-5) to Pierces
pursuant to Rule 7, which proposed Judgment included the attorney fees from September
5, 2014 through March 28, 2016. Pierces did not file any objection to these documents as
to form pursuant to Rule 7.
7
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below, nor argue it on appeal, and instead object only to the "duration" of fees awarded.
However, as argued above, even this argument has not been preserved and should not be
considered by this Court.
Pierces claim that there is "no Utah authority consistent with award of fees for the
entire case," and that fees should relate "to the motion itself, not to the underlying causes
of action." Brief at 32. This logic is not sound. The underlying causes of action form
the very basis for the lis pendens. Further, Pierces fail to preserve this argument. They
did not file a reply to Peterson's opposition to the motion to release (R.703) in which
these issues were addressed. In any event, Pierces were on notice, based on the March 9,
2015 hearing, July 20, 2015 Order, and Peterson's Trial Brief, that the Motion to Release
and the related request for attorney fees would be addressed at trial. Notwithstanding this
notice, Pierces failed to raise any counter-arguments on the issue of attorney fees below
and failed to object to the Affidavit of Attorney Fees. Tellingly, Pierces themselves
requested all their attorney fees for the entire case. R.2396, Day One Trial Transcript at
48:8-11. This is consistent with all counsel's communications with the undersigned since
the moment of Pierces' filing their motion to remove lis pendens.
Pierces make the conclusory argument that the trial court "erroneously" awarded
fees to Peterson, despite clear language from Utah Code§ 78B-6-1304. Brief at 33. That
statute provides that the trial court "shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing
party" unless it finds the non-prevailing party acted with substantial justification or other
circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees unjust. Utah Code § 78B-6-l 304(8).
The trial court made no finding of substantial justification or that "other circumstances"
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existed here. Pierces then turn the statute on its head. They argue that the trial court
"should not have awarded any fees unless Petersons' demonstrated that Pierces lacked
any 'substantial reason' to make the motion ...." Brief at 34 (emphasis in original).
~

Petersons do not have the burden of proof here. The burden belongs to the nonprevailing
party to show that they "acted with substantial justification" in filing the motion. Utah
Code§ 78B-6-1304(8)(a). The only way to prevail against the motion was for Peterson
to establish her claims, which she ultimately did at trial.

VI. Pierces Have Failed to Preserve Their Dispute of the Width of the Easement.
In passing, Pierces complain that the Court increased the easement from seven feet
wide to ten feet. Brief at 13. Pierces did not preserve this issue below. The trial court
found a reasonable width of 10 feet for the easement. R.2197, Conclusions at ,r 7. The
trial court found that the seven feet legal description only related to the frontage easement.
R.2197, Findings

~,r 26-28.

The location and width of the joint driveway easement were

addressed in the subsequent Motion to Enter Judgment and Decree which was supported
by Peterson's affidavit. R.2263-2271. Pierces filed no opposition to this motion. Therefore,
~

the matter 'is not preserved and the Court of Appeals need not entertain it.
.

.

VII. Peterson Should Be Awarded Her Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Peterson requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. "[W]hen a party
who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to fees
reasonably incurred on appeal.'" Valcarce, 961 P .2d at 319 (quoting Adams, 806 P .2d at
ld

1197). Peterson prevailed below, and should she prevail on appeal, her fees incurred on
appeal should be awarded. Here, the award of attorney fees is established by Utah Code

\t$
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§ 78B-6-1304(8). "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award
attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them." Salmon, 916 P.2d at
895. Accordingly, based on the trial court's award of fees pursuant to statute below, fees
on appeal should likewise be awarded to Peterson.
CONCLUSION
Peterson respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the trial court.
Pierces have failed to show that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous or
that its conclusions of law were incorrect with regard to any of their arguments on appeal.
Furthermore, the Pierces have failed to preserve several arguments on appeal, chief among
them being their challenge to the award of attorney fees. For these reasons, this Court
should uphold the ruling and order of the trial court.
DATED: March 31, 2017.
SNOW ENSEN & REECE, P.C.

By:
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FILED
MAY 31 2016
4.TH DiSTRICT
S IATE OF UTAH
MILLARD COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL H. PETERSON, Trustee,
~

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.
MARK A. PIERCE, et. al.,

Case No. 130700033
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on January 4-7, 2016, and again on
March 28, 2016. Plaintiff Carol H. Peterson ("Peterson") was represented by Lewis P. Reece.
Defendants Mark A. Pierce and Julie D. Pierce ("the Pierces") were represented by Dale B.

Kimsey. The Court directed the parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact, which were filed on
March 21 and 23, 2016.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
1. The properties at issue are adjacent properties and are located in Millard
County, state of Utah.
2. Plaintiff's parcel (hereinafter the "Peterson Parcel") is more particularly
described as:

Parcel 1
The South half of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Filmore City Survey, less the

South 70 feet.
1
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Parcel 2
Beginning 10 rods South of the Northeast Comer of Lot 6, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence South 5 rods; thence West 13 1/3 rods; thence North
5 rods, thence East 13 1/3 rods to the point of beginning.
3. Plaintiff and its predecessor in title acquired the Peterson Parcel on July 23, 1997.

Exhibits P-16.
4. Defend~ts' first parcel (hereinafter ''Parcel l ") is more particularly described as:

Beginning at the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City
Survey, thence West 194 feet; thence North 70 feet; thence east 194 feet, thence
South 70 feet to the point of beginning.
5. Defendants acquired Parcel 1 on June 12, 1989. Exhibit P-14
6. Defendants' second parcel (hereinafter "Parcel 2) is more particularly described as:

Beginning 194 feet West of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 139.5 feet; thence North 70 feet; thence East
139.5 feet; thence South 70 feet to the point of beginning.
7. Defendants acquired Parcel 2 on May 22, 1997. Exhibits P-18, P-19
8. Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel were all owned under common ownership by
Harold H. Hatton and Flora Allie G. Hatton, co trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocable
Family Trust, dated February 9, 1983. Exhibits P-31, P-32. The parties further stipulated to the
fact of unity of title for Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel.
9. Harold H. Hatton and Flora Allie G. Hatton are the parents of Carol Hatton Peterson,

Plaintiff trustee.
10. Harold H. Hatton and Allie G. Hatton are the grandparents of Defendant Julie Pierce.
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11. Plaintiff Carol Hatton Peterson is the aunt of Defendant Julie Pierce.
12. There exists a two rutted lane next to the Peterson Parcel and within Parcel 1, near the
northern boundary of the same as shown on Exhibit P-1 (hereinafter the Two Rutted Lane).

Exhibit P-1 is a 2014 aerial google photograph, but the testimony of all parties is that the
location of this two rutted lane as it passes through Parcel 1 is essentially the same as it has been
since the late 1930's. The parties dispute whether this Two Rutted Lane is the joint driveway
referenced in the Defendants' deeds. Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19.

13. Further, the parties stipulated that at the time of severance of Parcel 1, June 12, 1989,
use of the two rutted lane was open and apparent.

14. The Peterson home is located on the Peterson Parcel and is shown as the home in the
top portion of Exhibit P-1 ("Peterson Home"). This home was built in or about 1975 when
Harold Hatton retired from fanning and traded either his farm and/or his equipment to the
builder who built the home.
15. Defendants' home ("Pierce Home") is shown as the home on the bottom portion of

Exhibit P-1. This home has been located in its current location since approximately the late
1930's.
16. After Harold Hatton retired from fanning, he rented out the Pierce Home until it was
sold to the Pierces in June, 1989. Consequently from about 1975 until June 12, 1989, the Two
Rutted Lane served as a joint drive way to the Peterson Home and the Pierce Home. During that
time, Defendants Mark and Julie Pierce rented the Pierce Home from about 1986 until they
purchased the Pierce Home on June 12, 1989.

3
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17. Harold and Allie Hatton lived in the Peterson Home until their deaths in 1996.
18. The testimony is disputed whether Harold Hatton continued to use the Two Rutted
Lane as a joint driveway after he retired from farming and until his death in 1996. However, the
court is persuaded by the clear weight of the evidence that Harold Hatton continued using his
tractor to garden, clear off snow for neighbors, and for other purposes, that he drove his truck up
and down the Two Rutted Lane, and that he otherwise used the Two Rutted Lane as often as he
desired to access the back of his property (Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel), as
often as he needed or desired during that time.
19. This fact is further supported by the testimony of Mark & Julie Pierce wherein they
claim to have given Harold Hatton a license to use the Two Rutted Lane as often as he liked in
exchange for the first right of refusal to purchase Parcel 2. Exhibit P--15.
20. In so finding, however, this court does not find that such a license existed as the Court

~

will later explain in its findings and conclusions.
21. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants could not consent to Harold Hatton's use
of the two rutted lane by way of a license because the court likewise finds that Harold Hatton and
Defendants were not clear on the location of the boundary between the Peterson Parcel to the
north and Parcels 1 and 2 on the south.
22. Specifically, Defendant Mark Pierce testified that the boundary was by the telephone
pole to the east and at about to the southeast comer of the Starley fence on the west (Exhibit P2). Yet, on cross examination, it was clear that the west end of that boundary (or the Northwest
comer of Parcel 1) was roughly 25 to 30 feet away from the southeast comer of the Starley
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fence. The Court is persuaded by clear evidence that all parties considered the southeast comer
of Parcel I to be where the fence and the cement marker is, which is 4.5 feet south of where the
survey line is. The Court is further persuaded by the testimony of the witnesses, particularly
Betty Jo Durnell, that Harold Hatton and Lynn Hatton measured the 70 feet for the Parcel I from
the southeast comer of Parcel 1 using the fence line instead of the survey location. Consequently,
the testimony by Mark Pierce that the boundary was by the telephone pole is just as accurately
4.5 feet south of the telephone pole.
23. The Court is persuaded by clear evidence that neither Harold Hatton nor Defendants
knew where the survey line actually was for the boundary between the Peterson Parcel and
Parcels 1 and 2, and that this remained unknown until after Harold Hatton' s death and until the
line was surveyed and subsequently marked in the fall of 1997. Consequently, use of the Two
~

Rutted Lane by Harold Hatton until the time of his death was by historical use and under claim
of right, not by a license.
24. When Harold & Allie Hatton as trustees conveyed Parcel 1 to Mark and

~

Julie Pierce on June 12, 1989, there was a need to convey an additional seven (7) feet by way of
an easement so that Parcel 1 could be subdivided from the main parcel. The Court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that all parties understood that this frontag~ requirement was the
purpose of and reason for the seven foot easement north of Parcel 1 (the south seven feet of the
Peterson Parcel). The purpose was not for the joint driveway, and inclusion of the joint driveway
language in Exhibit P-14 in that seven feet easement was a scrivener's error.

5
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25. This finding is supported by, among other things, the plain language of Exhibit P-14
which expressly makes the conveyance of Parcel I subject to a joint driveway, and all parties
testified, including Defendant Mark Pierce, that there was only one access way back into Parcel
2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel, which was the Two Rutted Lane that has been in
existence for roughly 70 years. The Court is not persuaded in the least that Harold or Allie
Hatton, as Trustees, ever intended to convey Parcel 1 to Defendants without expressly giving
themselves access to use the two rutted lane so they could access the remainder of their property
(Parcel 2 and the west end of the Peterson Parcel). The Court is simply not persuaded by
Defendants' license claim especially in view of the express grant of an easement for a joint
~

driveway in Exhibit P-14.
26. Further, when Mark Pierce spoke with the surveyor, he told the surveyor that the
purpose of the seven foot easement north of Parcel 1 was for frontage. Exhibit P--37, page 73,

74.
27. Moreover, Julie Pierce testified that the seven foot easement was never used as a
joint driveway and that the purpose of the seven foot easement was for frontage, not for a joint
driveway. There was and has only been one joint driveway between the Peterson Home and the
Pierce Home, which is the Two Rutted Lane.
28. Keith Dalton testified that if the parties did not intend the seven feet as a joint
driveway, but for frontage only, and that the two rutted lane was the intended joint driveway,
then there was an error in the deed.

6
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29. Dale Robinson, the swveyor, further testified without rebuttal that typically legal
descriptions are inserted into deeds by someone other than the grantor, and that the grantor just
assumes that the legal description says what he intended it to say. Exhibit 37, page SS:25-56:5.
30. The Court is persuaded by the historic use of the Two Rutted Lane, by the testimony
of the parties, by Hatton' s need to use the Two Rutted Lane to access Parcel 2 and the west side
of the Peterson Parcel, as well as other testimony introduced at trial and through the exhibits, that
there was a scrivener's error, that Harold and Allie Hatton, Trustees, intended the seven foot
easement solely for frontage, and that they believed they expressly reserved use of the Two
Rutted Lane in Exhibit P-14 as the joint driveway.

31. The Court is further persuaded that Mark and Julie Pierce were equally aware that the
south seven feet in the Peterson Parcel was for frontage purposes only and that the Two Rutted
vb

Lane was to be kept and preserved as a joint driveway. Until the survey was performed and the
comers marked in the fall of 1997, Mark and Julie Pierce were unaware of the mistake in their
deed to Parcel 1.
32. With regard to the survey, following the death of Harold and Allie Hatton in 1996
(Allie Hatton died in late 1996), Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo Dunnell became the successor
trustees to the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust, dated, February 9, 1983 (hereinafter
the "Hatton Family Trust"). Because of previous family distrust and disputes, Lynn Hatton
requested that a survey be completed in connection with the sale of the Peterson Parcel to Larry
and Carol Peterson.
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33. That survey was not completed until July 8, 1997. This was after Parcel 2 was
(i1.i

conveyed to Mark and Julie Pierce. Consequently, the court takes nothing by the fact that the
deeds for Parcel 2 reiterated the south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel as the joint driveway.
The Court finds this was nothing but a perpetuation of the scrivener's error originating in the
deed to Parcel 1.
Julie Pierce testified that the portion of the property that is identified in the deeds as the
"easement" was her grandfather's lawn, and she would not have driven on that property. This
testimony further supports the Court's findings that the Pierces did not believe that the joint
driveway was to be located anywhere other than the two rutted lane that had been used for
decades.
34. The survey had been completed, however, when Larry and Carol Peterson took title
to the Peterson Parcel. There is a dispute in the evidence what was on the ground by way of
markers from the survey, when Larry and Carol Peterson purchased the Peterson Parcel. The
evidence is undisputed that the surveyor did not set the comers of the survey until the fall of
1997. Mark Pierce testified that the surveyor placed survey flags on the comers, but there was no
evidence that the flags were placed in such a way that an ordinary person without surveying
knowledge would understand the pwpose of the flag's location. Mark Pierce testified that he met
with Larry Peterson near the telephone pole, that there was a flag there, and that he told Larry
that flag meant that was the boundary of the property. He stated, however, that Larry did not
agree with him that that was the property line.

8
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35. Nonetheless, the Court finds that when Larry and Carol Peterson purchased the
property, they were aware of the dispute over the boundary. Exhibit P-21. The Court specifically
fmds by clear evidence that both Larry and Carol Peterson as well as their Grantors, Trustees of
the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was the joint driveway referenced
in the Pierces' deeds. Further, the Peterson deed expressly included easements, rights of way and
appurtenances. Exhibit P-16. Given that language and the language in the Pierce deeds,

(Exhibits P-14, P-18 & P-19), that expressly makes Pierces title subject to a joint driveway, and
given that there has never been but one lane used as a joint driveway between the Peterson Home
and the Pierce Home, the Court finds by clear evidence that Larry and Carol Peterson took title
with the full expectation and reliance that they would have access to the west of their property
through the Two Rutted Lane.
36. Moreover, the Court finds that Larry and Carol Peterson did in fact use the Two
Rutted Lane as a joint driveway as often as they needed. The testimony was clear and convincing
that Larry Peterson mowed the grass strip between the two rutted lanes weekly from the time he
purchased the property until shortly before his death or that he had others mow the strip on his
behalf when he was unable to do so. Mark Pierce testified that he did not see Larry Peterson do

this, but he also admitted that he worked from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. Mondays through
Fridays since before the Petersons purchased the Peterson Parcel to the present time. His
testimony did not effectively rebut the clear testimony from Carol Peterson and others that Larry
([;j

and Carol Peterson thought the joint driveway was theirs equally with the Pierces, and that they
used the Two Rutted Lane and cared for it like it was their own property.

9
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37. At the time of the conveyance of Parcel 2, Betty Jo Dunnell, the only surviving CoTrustee of the Hatton Family Trust, understood that the Two Rutted Lane was going to be used
by both property owners as a joint driveway.
38. Betty Jo Dunnell always understood the phrase 'Joint driveway'' to mean that both

owners had access to the driveway, as that is how it had always been. At the time of this
conveyance to Defendants, Betty Jo Dunnell, as co-trustee of the Hatton Family Trust, did not
have any understanding that the Trust was conveying away the Two Rutted Lane or the joint
driveway. That was not her intent. Indeed, her intent was that she was conveying access to the
joint driveway which had always been the Two Rutted Lane. The Court is persuaded by this
testimony.
39. After the Pierces acquired Parcels 1 and 2 and after Petersons acquired their parcel,
the Pierces had the surveyor mark the survey comers. This was in the fall of 1997, roughly eight
years after the Pierces acquired Parcel 1. See Exhibits P-8, P-22. This was after all the
conveyances at issue. Exhibits P-14, P-16, P-18 and P-19. Prior to this time, the property line
between Parcels 1 & 2 and the Peterson Parcel was not surveyed and marked and the Court finds
there was some confusion between the parties as to the precise location of the property line.
40. Every fence surrounding the original Hatton Family Trust parcel (Parcel 1,
Parcel 2 and the Peterson Parcel) is several feet off from the survey line. Exhibit P-2.
41. Many speculate on what Harold Hatton said about the joint driveway, but the only

document signed by Harold Hatton plainly states that the Pierces' receipt of Parcel I was
"subject to" the joint driveway. See Exhibit P-14. The deeds to both Parcels 1 and Parcel 2
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clearly make the conveyance to the Pierces "subject to" the joint driveway. See Exhibits P-14,

P-18 & P-19. This "subject to" language would have been entirely unnecessary if the parties to
those deeds had understood the location of the property line and that the joint driveway was the
south seven feet of the Peterson Parcel as the Pierces now argue. But that is not what happened
and the Court finds by clear evidence that that is not what the parties intended, either the Hattons
and the Pierces as to Parcel 1, or the successor trustees and the Pierces as to Parcel 2.
42. Larry and Carol Peterson's offer to purchase the property from the Hatton Family
Trust is also instructive. The offer is for the purchase of four parcels of property and
demonstrates that all parties understood the joint driveway was partly on the Pierce property and
partly on what was eventually the Peterson Parcel. The first parcel identified for purchase is the
Peterson Parcel. Compare Exhibit P-16 with Exhibit P-24, Parcel A. The second parcel
identified is the joint driveway between Parcels 1 and the Peterson Parcel. Exhibit P-24, Parcel
B. The third parcel identified for purchase is Parcel 2. Compare Exhibit P-24, Parcel C with

Exhibit P-18. Parcel 2 was sold to the Pierces because they exercised their right of first refusal.
The fourth parcel identified for purchase was the joint driveway between Parcels 2 and the
Peterson Property. Exhibit P-24, Parcel D. Exhibit P-24 was signed by both the Hatton Family
Trust and the Petersons. Id. It is not logical for the Petersons and the Hatton Family Trust to
agree to sell the Peterson Parcel and the joint driveway (Exhibit P-24, Parcels A and B) if the
Parties understood the joint driveway were entirely on the Peterson Parcel as the survey later
showed unless at the time, they were operating under the misunderstanding that the joint
driveway was partly on Parcel I or the Pierce property. The Court finds that the parties indeed
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were operating under a mutually mistaken belief that the joint driveway was partially on both the
Peterson Parcel and Parcel I.
43. Moreover, the easement referenced in Exhibit P-24, Parcel Bis identified as "an
established easement providing mutual ingress and egress for the adjacent properties [common
driveway] and was established by the Trust on June 12, 1989." Id. The only "established"
common driveway between the Peterson Parcel and Parcel I that was actually used as a common
driveway was the Two Rutted Lane. The Pierces admit that the seven feet immediately north of
Parcel 1 has never been used as a joint driveway. Julie Pierce Dep. at 25:9-16, and 25:19-26:14.
Consequently, the only joint driveway that was "established" and "providing mutual ingress and
egress,, to the properties at the time of the 1997 offer was the Two Rutted Lane plainly shown on
Exhibit P-1.

44. After the conveyance to the Pierces, Mr. Hatton continued to use the driveway
without incident until his death.
45. The Pierces were aware of Mr. Hatton's regular use of the driveway.
46. After Mr. Hatton died and the Peterson Property was conveyed to Larry and
Carol Peterson, Larry and Carol Peterson also used the driveway on a regular basis to gain access
to the back of the Peterson Property without asking permission of the Pierces. The clear
~

testimony is that they used it as often as they needed, including weekly to mow the grass and
otheiwise maintain the Two Rutted Lane.
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~

47. The Petersons used the shed in the back portion of their property to store tools and
equipment.
48. David Peterson, the son of Larry and Carol Peterson, would frequently come to visit
his parents and help out around the house. He would routinely take the truck to the back of the
Peterson Property using the Two Rutted Lane between the Pierce Property and the Peterson
Property. Since Larry Peterson's passing, David Peterson maintained the strip oflawn until the
Pierces installed the fence on the north edge of the driveway.
49. David Peterson would not ask the Pierces for permission to use the driveway on such
occasions.
50. After Larry Peterson's death, Mr. Pierce became confrontational about the Petersons'
use of the driveway, demanding that they request permission or attempting to deny access.
While the testimony also established that Mark Pierce made attempts to prevent the
Petersons from using the driveway, the Court is not persuaded that such attempts were
sufficiently successful to deprive the Petersons from such use.
~

51. The Petersons were able to access the back of the Peterson Property by using the Two
Rutted Lane until the Pierces constructed a fence on the north edge of their property in July
2013. The fence essentially prevents the Petersons' use of the Two Rutted Lane altogether and
leaves the Petersons without reasonable access to their property. This lawsuit was initiated
shortly thereafter.
52. Without the use of the Two Rutted Lane, the Petersons cannot access the back portion
of their property with a vehicle absent great difficulty.

13
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53. There is no reasonable access point on the north side of the Peterson Home.
54. The Petersons have a garden in the back of their property. They have sheds on the
back of their property. They have fruit trees on the back of their property. Their use of the Two
Rutted Lane is not a daily requirement. However, on occasion, they need to use the Two Rutted
Lane to service the garden, access their sheds, trim trees and bushes, etc. The Court finds that a
reasonable use should be allowed.
55. This Court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Two

Rutted Lane is the joint driveway as referenced in the relevant deeds and recorded documents.
Exhibits 14, 15, 18 and 19. The clear weight of the historical evidence and photographs

demonstrate that the Hattons intended to reserve to themselves and their successors in title use of
the Two Rutted Lane as a joint driveway. See e.g., Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, & 25. Specifically
with respect to Exhibit 14, the Court finds that the "subject to and together with a joint

driveway" language was a clear attempt by Harold Hatton and Allie Hatton, trustees, to reserve a
right of way over Parcel 1 for use of the Two Rutted Lane. The legal description following the
joint driveway language in Exhibit 14 was in obvious error. As Julie_ Pierce, a party to Exhibit
14 testified, the parties intended the easement for seven feet north of Parcel 1 as additional

frontage so they could sever Parcel 1 from the entire Hatton property. She testified that that
seven feet was not intended to be used as a joint driveway, but that the joint driveway was the
Two Rutted Lane. Further, neither Pierces nor the Hattons nor the Petersons ever used the seven
feet north of Pierce's property as a joint driveway. Petersons used the Two Rutted Lane as
though in fact it was the joint driveway to which they had an express easement under the terms
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of their deed. Exhibit 16. With the conveyance to their family trust, Petersons' use of the Two
Rutted Lane did not materially change.
56. After this lawsuit commenced, in an effort to rebut the legal presumption of adverse

use when the use is in excess of 20 years, Defendants now claim that they allowed Harold Hatton
to use the joint driveway by way of a license. They claim they granted Harold Hatton a license to
use the driveway during his lifetime in exchange for the agreement for a right of first refusal to
purchase Parcel 2. They claim that right of first refusal was given to Defendants at the time
Parcel 1 was conveyed to them. Exhibit P-15. Nowhere in Exhibit P-15, however, is there even
a hint of this license. This is odd, especially if the first right of refusal was given in exchange for
the license. The lack of any evidence whatsoever supporting a license in the right of first refusal
Agreement, is itself evidence that no such license existed. See e.g., Utah R. Evid. 803(7) and
803(10); see also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (''No estate or interest in real property ... shall be ..
. declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party ... declaring the same.").
57. Furthermore, based upon the evidence presented regarding Harold Hatton and his
character, the Court does not find it credible that Harold would rely solely on an oral license
from the Pierces to maintain his right to access the back portion of his property.
58. The fence along the south boundary line of the Pierce Property is 4.5 feet farther
south than the south boundary line described in the deeds as swveyed. In other words, the south
east comer of Parcel I, which is the beginning point for the legal description of both Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2, is off 4 ½ feet south, with the practical result being that the joint driveway is
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approximately half on the Parcels 1 and 2 and half on the Peterson Parcel. Exhibits P-2, P-7, P11.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

REFORMATION OF DEED BASED ON MUTUAL MISTAKE
1. Reformation is appropriate ''where the tenns of the written instrument are mistaken in

that they do not show the true intent of the agreement between the parties. There are two grounds

~

for refonnation of such an agreement: mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or mistake by
one party, coupled with fraud by the other party." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 136, 96
P.3d 935 (quoting Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984)). "A mutual mistake
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain." Robert Langson v. McQuarrie,

Gui

741 P.2d 554,557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). ''Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error in
reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to writing." Naisbitt v. Hodges, 307 P.2d 620,
623 (Utah 1957). "Paro! evidence is admissible to show the writing did not conform to the intent

~

of the parties." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666,669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Once a mutual
mistake has been shown, "the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration" in
reforming the deed. Id. The moving party has "the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a mutual mistake of fact." See Hatch v. Bastian, 561 P.2d 1100, 1102
(Utah 1977).

~
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2. Evidence of mutual mistake is abundant. The legal description in the deeds does not
match the actual boundaries of the rutted lane or joint driveway as it was used prior to and at the
time of conveyance. Furthermore, although the language in the deeds say that Defendants' land
is "subject to" a joint driveway, Defendants argue that there is no such easement on their
property but that the easement is actually on Plaintifr s property, thereby creating ambiguity in
the conveyances and strengthening the claim for mutual mistake. ht addition, the 4.5 feet
discrepancy on the southern border of Parcel 1 per the 1997 survey also supports the claim of
mutual mistake. And finally, the evidence that the actual easement described in the deeds (on the
Peterson Parcel) was never used by the parties as a joint driveway, creates further ambiguity in
support of the mutual mistake by the parties. In contrast, the existence of the joint driveway or
rutted lane, in essentially the same spot for over 50 years and used by both predecessor and the
parties, shows that when the parties to the deeds said "joint driveway'' in the deeds, they clearly
referred to the Two Rutted Lane they were using.
3. In McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P.2d 502 (1952), the defendant argued that
~

if any mistake were made in the conveyance, it was not a mutual mistake and therefore not a
basis for reformation. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's finding
of mutual mistake, holding that "[t]he fallacy of the argument relative to lack of mutuality is
readily seen by putting the shoe on the other foot." Id. at 506. A court may consider extrinsic
evidence, not for the purpose of divining contractual intent of the parties (thereby first requiring
a finding of ambiguity), "but rather to show the existence of mutual mistake." Robert Langston v.

McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Here, since Hatton is deceased, the Court
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must look to extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of the mutual mistake, which evidence
abounds.
4. Plaintiff seeks to reform Exhibits 14, 18 and 19 such that '~oint driveway" description

is no longer confused with the seven foot frontage easement north of Defendant's property.
Notwithstanding Mark Pierce's testimony that he knew where the north boundary of his property
was and that the joint driveway was along the grass on the south seven feet of Plaintiffs
property, which testimony the Court finds is not credible, the clear weight of the evidence,

4v

including the affirmative testimony of Julie Pierce at trial, is that the Hattons and the Pierces
believed that the joint driveway as described in Exhibit 14 was the Two Rutted Lane. This
mistake was mutual with both Hattons and the Pierces, and it was repeated in Exhibits 18 and

19.
5. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs right to reform the deeds is time barred or barred by

the doctrines of !aches. It is true that Plaintiff or her predecessor could have brought a claim to
reform the deed after discovering the survey line between the Peterson Parcel and Parcels 1 and

2. Plaintiffs predecessor, Larry Peterson, however, clearly claimed that he had an absolute right
to use the joint driveway as though it belonged to both Petersons and Pierces. See Exhibit 21.
Given that Petersons continued to use the Two Rutted Lane as though they had an absolute right
to use the same and given that Defendants did not block that right in any permanent or real way
until they put up the fence in the summer of 2013, the Court finds that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the summer of 2013. For that same reason, the Plaintiff's claim is not
barred by the doctrine of laches.
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(cJD

6. Consequently, the Court hereby directs that Exhibits 14, 18 and 19 be refonned to
clarify that the joint driveway is not the seven foot strip north of Defendants' property. Rather, it
is the Two Rutted Lane.
II.

WIDTH OF THE JOINT DRIVEWAY
7. The Court further directs that the Two Rutted Lane be surveyed, that the center be

located, and that Plaintiff's and her successor's right to use the Two Rutted Lane should be five
feet on each side of the center line for a total of ten feet, which is a reasonable width as testified

by Mr. Dale Robinson. D. Robinson Depo. 56:9-15. It is also a width that is consistent with the
historical use of the joint driveway, where it has been used to haul hay and other machinery. In
the alternative, the Court reserves this issue of the width of the Two Rutted Lane for further
hearing and testimony.

m.

EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY
8. Regarding easement by implication, the clear weight of the evidence must support each

of the elements necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (1) that unity of title was
followed by severance; (2) that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of
severance; (3) that the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant
estate; and (4) that the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. Ovard v.

Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1979); Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244,494 P.2d 950,
952 (1972); Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320,323 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

9. Each element for easement by implication is met in this case by the clear weight of the
evidence. First, as for unity of title followed by severance, Defendants' predecessors, the
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Hattons, conveyed their property into trust prior to any of the conveyances at issue. Parcels 1 and
2 and the Peterson Parcel were all owned by the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust,
dated, February 9, 1983, when the Pierces received Parcel 1 and then later Parcel 2. See Exhibits
31 & 32, and compare, Exhibits 14, 18 & 19. Further, Defendants stipulated to unity of title at

the outset of trial.
10. Second, Defendants stipulated that the use of the Two Rutted Lane was open and
apparent at the time of severance. Whether Defendants intended that this stipulation included the
severance of Parcel 2 in 1997 is immaterial. As stated above, the Court finds that that use was
open and apparent in Parcel 2 because at the time of severance in 1997, the Two Rutted Lane
was clearly visible and Defendant Julie Pierce had not directed that dirt be spread over the Two
Rutted Lane the area in front of the manger as she testified at trial. See testimony of James
Brunson, Betty Jo Dunne!, David Peterson, Carol Peterson, and Julie Pierce who testified that
she had dirt spread over the two ruts on the northwestern boundary of Parcel 1 and into Parcel 2,
in front of the manger. See Exhibit 1. As to photographic evidence, see Exibits 1, 4, 8, 9, and
22. Use of the Two Rutted Lane or joint driveway was apparent at the time of severance for both
Parcel I and Parcel 2. Further, Mark Pierce testified that he used the Two Rutted Lane and only
the Two Rutted Lane to access the back of his property, including the back of Parcel 1, with
vehicles and equipment when he needed.
11. Third, the Court finds that use of the Two Rutted Lane is reasonably necessary for
enjoyment of the Peterson Parcel. Much of the time at trial was spent on this issue, and
unnecessarily so. The law does not require absolute necessity, only a reasonable necessity.
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Consequently, the Court need not find that Plaintiff cannot access the west of her property absent
the Two Rutted Lane. Rather, the Court need only find by clear evidence that access absent the
Two Rutted Lane is unreasonably difficult. The Court so finds. The location of the telephone
pole, the tree stump, the irrigation lines and valves on the south side of the Peterson Home, gas
meter and lines which go directly south of the meter and then tum east down the Two Rutted
Lane, the cemented irrigation risers on the back lawn of the Peterson Home and the just over
seven feet clearance between the apple tree near the manger and the new fence placed by
Defendants, as well as the difficulty in driving a truck down that south side of the Peterson
Parcel, all lead the Court to conclude that access down that south side of the Peterson Parcel is
unreasonably difficult. See also Exhibits 9, 10, 13, 23, 36, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 115,
117, 118, & 119 and the testimony offered at trial. It is not reasonably necessary that Plaintiff
~

drive over her front lawn to access the west portion of her property.
12. Likewise, it is not reasonable that Plaintiff take out the wall, add fill, and remove
trees to access the west portion of her property from the north. See Exhibits 1, & 6 and the
testimony offered at trial.
13. Finally, the Court finds that Peterson's use of the Two Rutted Lane in both Parcels
I and 2 was continuous. Petersons maintained the center strip of grass between the two ruts by
mowing it weekly. They used the Two Rutted Lane to access their sheds, garden, fiuit trees and
otherwise to use and enjoy the west portion of their property. Defendants' parking of vehicles on
the Two Rutted Lane was sporadic and did not interfere with the continuous nature of Plaintifr s
use.
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14. Consequently, this Court finds that the Petersons have an easement by implication of
Gtil

reasonable necessity where the Two Rutted Lane is located and the right to use the Two Rutted
Lane as often as they so choose. Further, in the alternative, given the Court's findings of mutual
mistake and order for reformation of the deeds, Plaintiffs claim for easement by implication is
moot.
15. The Court does not reach a conclusion as to Plaintiff's other causes of action because
the decision on the easement by implication and mutual mistake are dispositive.
IV.

ADVERSE POSSESSION

16. Defendants claim they have adversely possessed the Two Rutted Lane on their
property. Application of adverse possession law in this manner is erroneous. Adverse possession
involves the following: one must hold and possess the property "adversely to the legal title"
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-2-208(2). Here, Defendants cannot be adverse because
Defendants are not adverse to the legal title. They own Parcels 1 and 2 over which the claimed
joint driveway exists as discovered in the 1997 survey. Defendant's payment of property taxes
and use of their property by itself does not defeat Plaintiffs claims for easements across
Defendants' property. The issue is one of control of the property where the easement is located.
As the Court has found above, Defendants have not been in exclusive control of the Two Rutted
Lane. Therefore, Defendants claim for adverse possession is denied.
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V.
~

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RELEASE LIS PENDENS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT
17. Following the filing of Plaintiffs complaint claiming prescriptive easements and

easements by implication, Plaintiff filed a Iis pendens on Parcel I and Parcel 2. The controlling
statute states: "Either party to an action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property may file a notice of the pendency of the action ...." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1303.
Defendants sought to have the Iis pendens released. "A court shall order a notice released if ..
.the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the
probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-1304(2) (emphasis added). Defendants contend that the lis pendens was improper and
should be released and they filed a motion for removal of the lis pendens and requested fees.
The recording of a lis pendens serves as a warning to all persons that any right or
interest they may acquire in the interim are subject to the judgment or decree.
One who acquires an interest in land that is the subject of pending litigation stands
in no better position than the person he acquires it from, he is charged with notice
of the claimed contrary rights of others, and he is bound by the judgment rendered
in the litigation.

Bagall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914,916 (Utah 1978). The lis pendens in this case
justifiably served as notice to the world that any purchaser would acquire the property subject to
Plaintiff's claims for easement and reformation of deed.
~

18. Given the Court's findings above on the easement by implication and mutual mistake
based upon clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs lis pendens was
properly filed.

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gful

19. Both parties request an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-1304(6), which provides in part: "A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a

prevailing party ... unless the court fmds that: (a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial
justification; or (b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.''
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs, insofar as those attorney's fees
and costs were incurred to defend against Defendant's Motion to Remove the Lis Pendens, and
establish Plaintiff's claim for an easement and mutual mistake. Plaintiffs attorney's fees and
costs incurred, therefore, before Defendants filed their September 5, 2014 Motion to Remove Lis
Pendens, are not recoverable. Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred since that time,
however, are recoverable. Plaintiffs attorney is directed to submit an affidavit of attorney's fees
and costs consistent with the rules, allowing Defendants to review and otherwise object to the
same before submitting them to the Court. If there is an objection, the Court may set the matter
for further hearing and issue a final decision.

ORDER
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare a Judgment and Decree consistent with the
foregoing that can be recorded with the Millard County Recorder.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Lewis P. Reece [5785]
Jonathan P. Wentz [11794]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
912 West 1600 South, Suite B-200
St. George, Utah 84 770
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
lreece@snowjensen.com
jwentz@snowjensen.com

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROL H. PETERSON, TRUSTEE OF
THE LARRY A. AND CAROL H.
PETERSON FAMILY TRUST, uad,
February 7, 2003,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND
DECREE
Civil No. 130700033

V.

Judge Jennifer A. Brown
MARK A. PIERCE; JULIE D. PIERCE,
and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby request that this Court enter the
Judgment and Decree prepared in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs counsel prepared Exhibit A and sent it via email to Defendants' counsel,
Mr. Dale B. Kimsey, on June 21, 2016. The time for filing an opposition to that proposed
Judgment and Order has expired. Utah R. Civ. P. 70)(4). No objection has been received and
consequently, the Judgment and Decree can be properly submitted to the court. Utah R. Civ. P.
70)(5). The problem comes with the legal description of the Joint Driveway in paragraphs I, 2,
and 3, and the legal description of the easement in paragraph 4 of the Judgment and Decree.

In the Court's Findings and Conclusions entered May 31, 2016, specifically paragraph 7
of the Conclusions of Law, this Court found that the center of the Joint Driveway should be
surveyed and that the Joint Driveway would be five (5) feet of each side of that center line, or in
the
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the alternative, that the matter be reserved for further hearing and testimony. As shown in
Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence, the center of the Joint Driveway is actually approximately six
(6) feet south of the north property line of Defendants' property. Thus, five feet on each of the
center leaves about a one (1) foot gap between the north edge of the Joint Driveway and the
north boundary of Defendants' property. That one foot is not usable and the effect is that
approximately eleven feet of Defendants' property is encumbered rather than ten feet.
To remedy that problem, Plaintiff prepared the Judgment and Decree to describe the Joint
Driveway and easement as a ten foot strip south of Defendants' northern boundary. Thus, only
ten feet of Defendants' property is encumbered. Plaintiff believes this is a reasonable approach.
Attached as Exhibit B is the Declaration of Carol Peterson in support of this Motion.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that based upon Plaintiffs Declaration, that this Court enter
the Judgment and Decree describing the Joint Driveway and easement as stated above.
DATED this 29 th day of June, 2016.
SNOW JENSEN & REECE, P.C.
By:

Isl Lewis P. Reece
Lewis P. Reece
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 30th day of June, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND DECREE was submitted for electronic
filing, with electronic notice, upon information and belief, automatically delivered to the
following:
Dale B. Kimsey
Attorney for Defendants

Isl Lewis Reece
Plaintiffs Attorney
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
LawJudgment
Library, J.&
Reuben
Motion
to Enter
DecreeClark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Lewis P. Reece [5785]
Jonathan P. Wentz [11794]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
912 W 1600 S, Suite B-200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
LReece@snowjensen.com
JWentz<@snowjensen.com

~

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL H. PETERSON, TRUSTEE OF THE
LARRY A. AND CAROL H. PETERSON
FAMILY TRUST, uad, February 7, 2003,
Plaintiff,

v.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Civil No. 130700033
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

MARK A. PIERCE; nJLIE D. PIERCE, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on January 4, 5, 6, 7, 2016, and March 28, 2016, for
trial and hearing on Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Defendant's Counterclaim, and
Defendants' Motion to Release Lis Pendens and Request for Fees; and the Court having made and
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 31, 2016; and based upon the
same and otherwise finding good cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

DP 2 Judgment 062016 710701 jpw-lpr.rtf
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I.

The Warranty Deed recorded June 13, 1989, as Entry No. 73528, Book 227, Page

632 with the Millard County Recorder, state of Utah, is hereby modified and reformed in part as
follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a joint
driveway over and across the following described property: Beginning 70
feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 194 feet; thence South 7
feet; thence East 194 feet to the point of beginning.
is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Grantors and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 194 feet along the north
boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence East 194 feet to the
point of beginning.
2.

The unrecorded Special Warranty Deed, executed by Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo

Dunnell, co-trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust dated February 9, 1983, as
Grantors, and Mark A. Pierce and Julie D. Pierce, as Grantees, signed by Grantors on May 19,
1997, is hereby modified and reformed in part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 136 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East 136 feet to the point of beginning.
is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Grantors and Grantees and their respective
Judgment and Decree
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successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
194 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 136
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence
East 136 feet to the point of beginning.
3.

The Quitclaim Deed recorded June 6, 1997 as Entry No. 00117369, Book 00316,

Pages 00462-00463 in the Millard County Recorder's Office, is hereby modified and reformed in
part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 139.5 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.
is hereby stricken and replaced with the following:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Granters and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
194 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 139.5
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence
East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.
4.

Carol H. Peterson, trustee of the Larry A. and Carol H. Peterson Family Trust, uad,

February 7, 2003, and her successors and assigns are further granted an easement for ingress and
egress by way of implication of reasonable necessity over the following described property
located in Millard County, state of Utah, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City
Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 219.37 feet along the north boundary of the
property; thence South 10 feet; thence East 219 .3 7 feet to the point of beginning.
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5.

Plaintiff and her successors-in-interest have the right to use the "Joint Driveway"

described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above and the easement described in paragraph 4 above as
often as Plaintiff and her successors may choose. Defendants, and each of them, and all those
acting in concert with them and Defendants' successors and all those acting in concert with them
~

are hereby forever enjoined from obstructing Plaintiff and her successors' access to and use of the
aforementioned Joint Driveway and easement in any way whatsoever.
6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-6-1304(8), Plaintiff is awarded her attorney

fees and costs as the prevailing party in defending against Defendants' Motion to Remove the Lis
Pendens and establishing her right to file and to maintain recordation of her lis pendens based
upon her legal theories presented at trial, which was held concurrently with the hearing on
Defendants' Motion, incurred between September 5, 2014 (when Defendants filed their Motion to
Remove the Lis Pendens) and March 28, 2016 (the last day of trial).
7.

Having received and reviewed the affidavit of attorney's fees and costs submitted

by Plaintiffs counsel, and finding good cause, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants Mark Pierce and Julie Pierce and
each ofthem,jointly and severally, in the amount of$115,378.25 in attorney's fees and $4,448.74
in Costs, for a total judgment of $119,826.99, plus interest thereon at the statutory rate of 2.65%
per annum until the judgment is paid in full.

8.

Defendants' claims for trespass, quiet title, injunctive relief, adverse possession, no

privity, failure to state a claim, no mutual mistake, and no implication of necessity are dismissed
with prejudice. With regard to the Defendants' laches defense, the Court has previously found
that the deeds to Defendants were ambiguous given the "subject to" language and the location of
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the joint driveway as described in the deeds. There would be no reason for Defendants to take
title "subject to" a joint driveway if the joint driveway were actually located on Plaintiffs
property and not on Defendants' property. That ambiguity or defect in the deed is perpetual
unless corrected. The Court has inherent equitable powers to clarify and correct an ambiguous
deed and avoid a perpetual mistake continuing of record. Neither party can benefit by sitting on
their hands to the detriment of the other party when the deeds themselves are ambiguous.
Moreover, not until July, 2013, did Defendants truly block Plaintiffs use of the two rutted lane.
Consequently, this Court denies Defendants' defenses oflaches and statute oflimitations.
SO ORDERED.
- - - - - - - - - - - E N D OF O R D E R - - - - - - - - - - -

(The Court's date-stamp and electronic signature appear at the top of the first page.)

NOTICE
Please be advised that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7G)(5), you have seven days from
service upon you to file an objection to the foregoing proposed Judgment and Decree. Kindly
advise if you are able to approve the order as to form, which does not waive any objections to the
substance of the foregoing proposed order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(j)(3).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on June 21, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
be sent via email as follows: Dale B. Kimsey, Esq., dbkimsey@hotmail.com.

Isl Lewis Reece
Lewis P. Reece, Plaintiffs Attorney
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Lewis P. Reece [5785]
Jonathan P. Wentz [11794]
Tonaquint Business Park
912 W 1600 S, Suite B-200

St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
Email: lreece@snowjensen.com
jwentz@snowiensen.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL H. PETERSON, TRUSTEE OF THE
LARRY A. AND CAROL H. PETERSON
FAMILY TRUST, uad, February 7, 2003,

DECLARATION OF CAROL
PETERSON (June, 2016)

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 130700033

MARK A. PIERCE; JULIE D. PIERCE, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,

Judge: Jennifer Brown

Defendants.

I, Carol Peterson, hereby state as follows:
l.

I am the surviving trustee of the Larry A. and Carol H. Peterson Family Trust,

uad, Februaty 7, 2003. I am the daughter of Harold H. Hatton. I testified extensively at the trial
in this case and set forth the basis ofmy knowledge of the Joint Driveway at issue. I have seen

and used the Joint Driveway since about the late 1930s. I have personal knowledge about the
facts set forth herein.
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2.

I have measured the location of the Joint Driveway as shown in Exhibit 11, which

was admitted into evidence. The centerline is about six feet south of the north boundary of

Defendants' property. If the Joint Driveway were measured five feet on each side of that center
line, there would be about a foot between the north boundary of the Joint Driveway and the north

boundary of Defendants' property that would be essentially wasted.
3.

Rather than encumber essentially eleven feet of Defendants' property for the Joint

Driveway, I ask the court to measure the joint driveway as ten feet south of the north boundary
of Defendants' property. This is consistent with the historic use of the Joint Driveway.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on this 30th day of June, 20 J6.
Isl

(&,,,{/l ~

CAROL PETERSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of June, 2016, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECLARATION OF CAROL PETERSEN (June, 2016), by via electronic filing,

with electronic notice sent upon infonnation and belief to the following:
Dale B. Kimsey, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants

Isl Lori Cuskelly
Legal Assistant
lwP
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SNOW JENSEN & REECE
Lewis P. Reece [5785]
Jonathan P. Wentz [ 11794]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
912 W 1600 S, Suite B-200
St. George, Utah 84 770
Telephone: (435) 628-3688
LReece(a)snowjensen.com
JWentz@snowjensen.com

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(j;g

CAROL H. PETERSON, TRUSTEE OF THE
LARRY A. AND CAROL H. PETERSON
FAMILY TRUST, uad, February 7, 2003,
Plaintiff,

v.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Civil No. 130700033
Judge Jennifer A. Brown

MARK A. PIERCE; JULIE D. PIERCE, and
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on January 4, 5, 6, 7, 2016, and March 28, 2016, for
trial and hearing on Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Defendant's Counterclaim, and
Defendants' Motion to Release Lis Pendens and Request for Fees; and the Court having made and
~

entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 31, 2016; and based upon the
same and otherwise finding good cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. The Warranty Deed recorded June 13, 1989, as Entry No. 73528, Book 227, Page

September 21, 2016 05:08 PM
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632 with the Millard County Recorder, state of Utah, is hereby modified and
refonned in part as follows:
~

The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a joint
driveway over and across the following described property: Beginning 70
feet North of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 194 feet; thence South 7
feet; thence East 194 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Granters and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore
City Survey, thence North IO feet; thence West 194 feet along the north
boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence East 194 feet to the
point of beginning.

2. The unrecorded Special Warranty Deed, executed by Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo
Dunnell, co-trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust dated
February 9, 1983, as Granters, and Mark A. Pierce and Julie D. Pierce, as
Grantees, signed by Granters on May 19, 1997, is hereby modified and reformed
in part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,

Judgment and Decree
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~

Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 136 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East 136 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following language:

~

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Granters and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
194 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 136
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence
East 136 feet to the point of beginning.

~

3. The Quitclaim Deed recorded June 6, 1997 as Entry No. 00117369, Book 00316,
Pages 00462-00463 in the Millard County Recorder's Office, is hereby modified
and reformed in part as follows:
The existing language:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint driveway
over and across the following described property: Beginning 194 feet
West and 70 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence North 7 feet; thence West 139.5 feet; thence
South 7 feet; thence East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.

is hereby stricken and replaced with the following:
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an Easement for a Joint
Driveway in favor of Granters and Grantees and their respective
successors over and across the following described property: Beginning
194 feet West and 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block
49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence North IO feet; thence West 139.5
feet along the north boundary of the property; thence South 10 feet; thence
East 139.5 feet to the point of beginning.
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4. Carol H. Peterson, trustee of the Larry A. and Carol H. Peterson Family Trust, uad,
February 7, 2003, and her successors and assigns are further granted an easement
for ingress and egress by way of implication of reasonable necessity over the
following described property located in Millard County, state of Utah, more
~

particularly described as follows:
Beginning 60 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City
Survey, thence North 10 feet; thence West 219.37 feet along the north boundary of the
property; thence South IO feet; thence East 219 .3 7 feet to the point of beginning.

5.

Plaintiff and her successors-in-interest have the right to use the "Joint Driveway"
~

described in paragraphs I , 2 and 3 above and the easement described in paragraph
4 above as often as Plaintiff and her successors may choose. Defendants, and each
of them, and all those acting in concert with them and Defendants' successors and

~

al1 those acting in concert with them are hereby forever enjoined from obstructing
Plaintiff and her successors' access to and use of the aforementioned Joint
Driveway and easement in any way whatsoever.
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-6-1304(8), Plaintiff is awarded her attorney
fees and costs as the prevailing party in defending against Defendants' Motion to
Remove the Lis Pendens and establishing her right to file and to maintain
recordation of her lis pendens based upon her legal theories presented at trial,
which was held concurrently with the hearing on Defendants' Motion, incurred
between September 5, 2014 (when Defendants filed their Motion to Remove the
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Lis Pendens) and March 28, 2016 (the last day of trial).
7. Having received and reviewed the affidavit of attorney's fees and costs submitted
by Plaintiff's counsel, and finding good cause, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants
Mark Pierce and Julie Pierce and each of them, jointly and severally, in the amount
of$115,378.25 in attorney's fees and $4,448.74 in Costs, for a total judgment of
$119,826.99, plus interest thereon at the statutory rate of2.65% per annum until
the judgment is paid in full.

8. Defendants' claims for trespass, quiet title, injunctive relief, adverse possession, no
privity, failure to state a claim, no mutual mistake, and no implication of necessity
are dismissed with prejudice. With regard to the Defendants' Iaches defense, the
Court has previously found that the deeds to Defendants were ambiguous given the
"subject to" language and the location of the joint driveway as described in the
deeds. There would be no reason for Defendants to take title "subject to" a joint
driveway if the joint driveway were actually located on Plaintiff's property and not
on Defendants' property. That ambiguity or defect in the deed is perpetual unless
corrected. The Court has inherent equitable powers to clarify and correct an
ambiguous deed and avoid a perpetual mistake continuing of record. Neither party
can benefit by sitting on their hands to the detriment of the other party when the
deeds themselves are ambiguous. Moreover, not until July, 2013, did Defendants
truly block Plaintiff's use of the two rutted lane. Consequently, this Court denies
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Defendants' defenses of Iaches and statute of limitations.
SO ORDERED.
- - - - - - - - - - E N D OF O R D E R - - - - - - - - - - -

(The Court's date-stamp and e]ectronic signature appear at the top of the first page.)
NOTICE
Please be advised that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 70)(5), you have seven days from
service upon you to file an objection to the foregoing proposed Judgment and Decree. Kindly
advise if you are able to approve the order as to form, which does not waive any objections to the
substance of the foregoing proposed order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 70)(3).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be sent via email
as follows: Dale B. Kimsey, Esq., dbkimsev@.hotmail.com.

Isl Lewis Reece
Lewis P. Reece, Plaintiffs Attorney

Judgment and Decree
Peterson v. Pierce
PageLibrary,
6 of6 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

September 21, 2016 05:08 PM

6 of 6

78B-6-1304
MOTIONS RELATED TO A NOTICE OF PENDENCY
OF AN ACTION

(i)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ 78B-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of pendency of an action, UT ST§ 78B-6-1304

KeyCite YeJlow Flag- Negative Treatment
Proposed Legislation

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos)
Part 13. Quiet Title (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-1304
§ 78B-6-1304. Motions related to a notice ofpendency of an action

Currentness
(1) Any time after a notice has been filed pursuant to Section 78B-6-l 303, any of the following may make a motion to
the court in which the action is pending to release the notice:

Gt)

(a) a party to the action; or

(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice, including a prospective purchaser with an
executed purchase contract.

(2) A court shall order notice of pendency of action released if:

(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (I); and

(b) after a notice and hearing if determined to be necessary by the court, the court finds that the claimant has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the real property c1aim that is the subject of the notice.

~

(3) In deciding a motion under Subsection (2), if the underlying action for which a notice of pendency of action is filed
is an action for specific performance, a court shall order a notice released if:

(a) the court finds that the party filing the action has failed to satisfy the statute of frauds for the transaction under
which the claim is asserted relating to the real property; or

Q
(b) the court finds that the elements necessary to require specific performance have not been established by a
preponderance of the evidence.

(4) If a court releases a claimant's notice pursuant to this section, that claimant may not record another notice with
respect to the same property without an order from the court in which the action is pending that authorizes the recording
of a new notice of pendency.
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§ 78B-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of pendency of an action, UT ST§ 78B-6-1304

(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the subject of a notice of pendency, a court
may, at anytime after the notice has been recorded, require, as a condition of maintaining the notice, that the claimant
provide security to the moving party in the amount and form directed by the court, regardless of whether the court has
received an application to release under Subsection (1 ).

(6) A person who receives security under Subsection (5) may recover from the surety an amount not to exceed the amount
of the security upon a showing that:

(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and

41

(b) the person receiving the security suffered damages as a result of the maintenance of the notice.

(7) The amount of security required by the court under Subsection (5) does not establish or limit the amount of damages
or reasonable attorney fees and costs that may be awarded to a party who is found to have been damaged by a wrongfully
filed notice of pendency.

(8) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion under this section unless the court
finds that:

(a) the non prevailing party acted with substantial justification; or

(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1073, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2016, c. 306, § 2, eff. May 10, 2016.

Notes of Decisions (1)

(iy

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-1304, UT ST§ 78B-6-1304
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
End of Document
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,...AB"l!R RECOJU)lffO MAit TOr
Mr, aad Mt's. Katk A, fjerce
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P.O, BO¥ 1215

Pill~oTe, Otah 84631

V~TY DBl!'J)

WOLD s. BA'n'Olf and l'LORA At.r,lB o. &AT'J:ON J co ..flUJSTSBS
OP TflB WOLD I, KM'TON RRV0COLB PAMU.Y TRUST

»at~d labroaiy 9, 1983
gra~tor; of Fillmore. County of Millard, State of Utah,
hereby CONVEJ QiD WAJUWIT tD
MARK A PtBRCB and JULlB D. PIERCE

buebaod and wife aa joint tenants

granteae of P,O, Box 1215, Pilll!lDTe, County of MillaTd, State of Utah.
for th• sum of

'TSN AND H0/100 DOLLARS AMU OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLB CONSlDE'BJ.flOR
the fo1lowillg described tTact of land in 'Millard County, State of U~ah,
to-witr
Beginning at the Southeaat corriec of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, 11lllltor:a
City su"ey, theu~a West 194 feet& the.nee North 70 feet; thanca taut 194
fear: tbence South 70 feet to the po.!.nt of beginning.
SUDJBC'l' Ta AHD toGETIIBR WITH an Basement fo-r Joint J>tivsway over

and

8cross the following descTibad propertyr

Beginning 70 feat Horth o! the
Southeast cor~er of Lot 7, Blo~k 49, Plat A~ nlllllore City Survey, thence
North 7 feat; thence Vest 194 feet; thence South 7 £eet; tben~e Bast t94
feet to. the poinc of be.ginn:tna-.
TOGBTHIUl WITH .l/3 sh~re of Fillllore !later Users Association, lnc. water stock

0P

Wr.rRESS the bands of aaid grantora, this 12th day of Ju~e A,D. 1989.

Florri Al1:t~ G, 1latton, Co-Trustee

)

~i'AXB OF U'J:All

COtJNTY 07 MtLLARD
On

)ss
)

the l 2ch day of

:!:tt:?~~~

Hat ton and Plo,:11_
ack.a(>wledged to 11e

v.t thin instrument who duly
e sdma.

.

. ry/Jla.b
01

•

KnBiding at:
t•. • . _ 11-•n, t

e
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AGREEMENT

·.

Gv

sEctJRITYTITLEOOMPANY-

BY:

011

Mi~

n.~TY-~.
-~--

This agreement is being entered into this
)1~~ day of June,. 1989 by and
between HAROLD H. HATTON and FLORA ALLIE G. HATTON, Co-Trust·ees of the Harold
H. Hatton Revocable Family Trust, dated February 9, 1983.(hereinafter referred
to as Sellers) and MARK A PIERCE and JULIE D. PIERCE 1 his wife (hereinafter
referred to as Buyers).

~

I

'

It is hereby agreed• tha.t if the SELLERS decide to sell any oJ: all of that
certain real property described below, the buyers have the exclusive right to
pur~hase said prop,rty.
Beginning 194 feet West of the Sou_theast corner Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 136 feet; thence North 70 feet; thence East
136 feet; thence South 70 feet to the point of beginning.

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH an easement for a joint Driveway over and across
the followi:ng described property: Beginning 194 feet West and 70 feet North of
the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Block 49, Plat A, Fillmore City Survey, thence·
North 7 feet; thence West 136 feet; thence South 7 feet; thence East 136 feet
to the point of beginning.
The selling price of any of said property being offered for sale will pe set
by the herein named SELLERS. BUYERS to have the right to accept or reject any
selling price set by the SELLERs.

~~~~///~~
"Harold H. Hatton, Co-Trustee

-l;fato..
(lil► uJ J/4:~
Flora Allie G. Hattori'? Co-Trustee

rf
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~TATE OF .UTAH

)

~

COUNJY OF MILLARD
01;1, tne

hticE
I-

.....

)SS

\""2-~

)

day of June A. n. 1989 personally appeared before· me MARK· A.

and JULIE D.

PIERCE the signer of

the within iristrument who

-~clmowledged to me that they executed the same •

. Notary Pupl_ic

Residing at:Comm. Exp.:

;.

STATE Of UTAH

COUNTY OF MILLARD

)
• )SS
)

-

"': ;

On the

\"2!:b_ · day of ;}JJfJe
A:D. 1988 ?~rso-nally appeared before me
r
HAROLD H. HATTON and FLORA ALLIE G. HATTON the signer of the within instru~~nt
,. -~ . ·wh·o dul'y 1 ackriowledgeo to me that they· ·executed the same,

Not{iry Public

.r

...

Residing at:

l

Comm .. Exp.:

.T

~.-

.•-

~

.
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WARRANTY DEED

~-

·t
.•, t1:,

.

,:fBBTTY JO DUNNBLL md LYNN H. HATION, SUCCBSSOR 00-TRUSTBBS of tho Harold

H.
-grantota

• ' 1Hatton Rovccable Fam1Jy Trust, Dated Pobroary 9,. \983.,

· •.jJotSalt Lliko City• 84118, Co1Dll)' of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVl!Y and W.AlmAlIT
._ ~,1LAR.1W A, PETERSON and CAROL H. PBTBRSON, h11sband and wJr~ as joint tcna_nls

"t!•

• ~. • :

to

grantees

o!Pfllmoro, 84631, County of Millard, Stato of Utah, for 1hD sum of TBN DOLLARS and othet good
.rf; Dnd valuablo corudderation, lhe £o1low1ng deBCrlbed tract of land in Millard County, Stare of Uftlb, to-wit:
• .Jc:

;r •

PARcm,,t;

· \ti·;

~-t

Th,Sot6mlfofLot7iBlock49,PiltA,FillnY.eCil;yStmy,
I.mS:Soolb.70:l.cet. .

,•,.1 •

½·.
d!:i
0 ,··

~

PARCIJ,,2:

Beghutlog10ro::kSocthof1hciNcrth::ast~ofl..ct6,BJxk49,P!atA.Ydlllne~£un,ey,1h:i=
SoubS rods;~ Weti 1311.hods;1hen:;eNoctb5roos:tbenieB&tl31/3rodsto d»)Xlintof
b=gimi,g.
.

~t-·

E-11
i-,;;,,,.

roommR Wlnl All rlgh~ prlvlleges, casements, rights of way, lmpro\1omo11ts ruid
e..ppurtenD11ces tliereunlo balongfng or In Ull)'WD)' appertaining thinto,

Z~-·-

c)

.

,~-a:~--

1·

SUBJBCTTO ~vcnllllts1 conditions, resbioUons, ro,mvaUcns,eanmenb 1111d right, of way or
~cord.

I-~·

l/J ••

a:
. ii:

.
.,,

...•

~--'. .~ WlTNESS tho hands of said grantors, this;{:)

day of July, 1997,

\:

:-· Signed lo UN: prcsonco of
1:•L

.._,

--------------t.

,.,
·--------------•'

·,
: STA'raOFUTAH

I

}

ss,

. -: County of MILLA.lID
•;:

&

•;•. • On the
day of July, A,D, 1997, personally appcored bofor¢ ntc BB'l"fY JO DUNNEL and LYNN
~• · H. HA'ITONt lho signora of the within instrument who duly noknowlcdged to mo that 1he)y =xecutcd the
·,[, 11nn1a ns Suooessor Oo-Tmtcco of the HaroJd H. Hniton·Risvocabfa F.omtly 'mist. Doted February 91
·. i~iii,1983,

,

.:~:la-~·]
:· (·
"'Cb°I'•

~UliPlt.a""ZJ

~

.L:...:.... ~- _._A":;&'~--

My Commlss!011 &p!rcs:

..,+6

...

-r

Alf.BJtr

o.,
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@ 00-01/000.2
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:&corded e.t ~quest.of
·w.addingham.&P-ete.rson, P.C
.5'M. West Main
1'e1ta,· ur 84624

i

I

I

I

'f~., 1lt't,•J
}J t,JJ~ 3k oom P, IJ02~1J•-O~~?~
!k.JR,;
t~CO~l)et~ ~~I£ ~ ~Ai;~fl
~ll).1 tt& 1 tv-t.29 jM r-tE ,1~.~ :-r %'&
·.wwr,11•v..11/.
,,~-··•1:\~1
, .... , r rrttr.,i
1~.1m Ji: r""H'-b."'011
-r~11: n

~;IMil'

Whoo ·~to.tided, retum ·t;o:
Waddhtgham &-.P~te.aon, P,G
}61: Wes; Mafo
Delta, Uf·8.;J&24

.
r
I

SPEQAL WARRANTY DEED

1

I

.

G,

I

LARRY·A.. PETERSON and CAftOL H, PETERSON., -GRANTORS~ hereby
CONVEY AN!}- W/tRRANT .against -all e:utlniing b)'f wou~, or under l.aid Granters, to
tARR-'Y ~ :PHT·Ei{S.QN aruJ CAROL H~ 1?ETERSON1 tr-us·tees1 and teir -success0.ts :as
~t\ilS-t~s-, -of the "Le.ny "(\. and Carol~ P.eremoRFStmily Trust -created .under R igteement dared
.Flebt.titcryirlO'OO.,:-Qf.P..O~ B·ox 744,.Fillmo.re, trl"84631, .GRANf!JE, fortihe s of T.EN AND
NO/Hf.JIIDREO!HS DOLLARS (510,00} .and other good -a:nd val1,1ab1e ponsid?r.ation the
fq.1lowfug_ cilesctjbed real p1t0p,mylo.cated u1 me O>unty:0f MiUard., S:tate of Utah:
~

~

PARCEL l: The So~th h~ C?Jf Lot 7, B1oa1t 49., Plat A, Fillmore CitySu.rJe)t
LES$ -the South W f,eet.

.

f

PARCEL 2: Beginning 10-·Fl)CU S.outh of the Northeast-com-e-r of Lor 6-f ml-ck
49 ,Plat A, .Fillmore CTty S'Ul'\'.e~ :the-nee. South S toe1si then ere \Xl-es-r
1J.. % rods-; :the~ce North 5 rods; 1:hen.ee E·as.t l 3 Vo rods to 1
he
pemt -of be,glltr.Wlg.
.
i
TOGETHER Willi all unprovemem.s thereon and. appurtenruices -t~rreto,
1

SU,B;JECT'TOalle~r-nents, r«serva.tlorui, .restrictions and right:S-of•w~r~ of rec·orcl
ru which may be .asGei'tained from :an llls.p.ecclon of the- prope.tty.
,

Wln:IESS the he.ncls ol said G=tooi, rhls

JR -day.ol:Pebl'll!U}",.ujoo,

.~
. . Q")1
,.~~Plt"'m.RSON
0b

l

I

CeM:li~~

:CAROL H J ? ~ O *

n

fr

t

vi)
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)

:-ss.
COill.t-IYOF MILLAAD )
On ch& YJ't} dny Gl F.ehrual¾ 200), :personally appeared befod me LARRY A.
P.E'mRSON and CAROL H. PETERSON, whG• belngfhst dtilyawom,_ did ~y1bat thcy1U"C the
&i.gnel' of 'the foregolng Specinl Wamnty Deed,.and dw1 aclaiffledged that~tbey.oxe<:1.ned the
8atne,

;

1
1

.OJO!O}Jl,(\.pewrsoo .w:I

2
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Wheo recorded. mall to:

Mall tax notice to grantee at eddress hera(n.
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
Lynn Hatton and Betty Jo DunneU, co-trustees of the Harold H. Hatton Revocabl~
Famny Trust dated February 9, 1983, Grantors1 of 6186 South Wakefield Way, SaJt Lake
City, Utah· 84118, hereby CONVEY 11ND WARRANT against all claiming by, through or
under them to Mark A Pierce and Julie D. Pierce, husband and wife as Joint 1enants with
full rights of survivorship, Grantees 1 of P. 0. Box 1215, Ftllmore, Utah 84631, for the sum
of TEN DOLLARS1 and other good and valuable consideration the followlng described tract
of Jand in Millard County, State of Uta_h:
BEGINNING 194 feet West of the Southeast corner of lot 7, Block 49, Plat A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 136 feet; thence No(ih 70 feet; fhence East 136
feet; thence South 7-0 feet to the point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WJTH an easement for a Joint driveway over and
across the foUowfng descrfbed property: BeglnnJng 194 feet West and 70 feet North
of the Southeast corner of Lot 7, Bfock 49J Plat A1 FIilmore City SuivayJ thence
North 7 feet; thence West 136 feet; thence South 7 feet. thence East 136 feet to the
pofnt of beginning..
·

SUBJECT TO encroachments"' overlaps, adverse boundary llne clahns,
easements, restrictions, and covenants whether or not of record enforceable
in raw or equity and all taxes and assessments from the date hereof and
thereafter.
·
• GRANTEES aooe,pt the property conveyed hereunder AS lS.
WITNESS 1.the hands of sa1d Grantors, this . /9~
~day of May, 1997,
THE HAROLD H. HATTON REVOCABLE

FAMlLYT
VIP

T

a.. rustee

1)~
~
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Peterson 00013

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

A1

On this .l5._ day of May, 1997, personally appeared before me Lynn Hatton,
Trustee, persona Uy known to me or proved to Jrte on the basis of satisfactory evidence to
be the person whose name le signe.d on the preceding document, and acknowledged to
me that he signed it for and on behalf of the ab a-mentioned
.-, trust for
. ts stated purpose •
._tiQTM'(PUBUC
IJUMl''l'.W.lMIBDN
Waatfbl8®1h
!al Lzrb Cit)', l1r D41~
MyOommlsslon Exptn,a
JM1Wf 1li,.2001
STA'tE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC ·

)

:ss
COUNTY OF

.

.'
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Wben :r:eowed mall j(J;
00.11?Z-69 ~tioo:!11 P.GtlmR-00(~

-Q1J.R?UB

b!tiff •• 0011ce 10 greutes ot mldrus &ruwn,

•
QIJirPLAfM MEO

IJlffsffDJrtllJI

~
ORAN'r-EE:Btii*Pt ihe ,srop~ oonvay~d horeundor AS JS,
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